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Abstract: The Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. is 
probably best known for articulating the importance of transformativeness in analyzing fair 
use claims. The opinion gave less-noticed but important guidance on the third statutory fair 
use factor, which looks at the amount and substantiality of the portion of the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work that the defendant used. Campbell explained that courts should evaluate 
this factor by inquiring whether the amount the defendant used was reasonable in light of her 
purpose. This Article examines the appellate fair use decisions since Campbell to investigate 
whether and how lower courts have used Campbell’s reasonableness approach. The Article 
pays particular attention to cases in which the defendant claiming fair use has used the 
plaintiff’s entire work, including in ways only recently made possible by new technologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fair use limits the rights of copyright owners. Someone who uses a 
copyrighted work without permission in a way that would ordinarily 
come within one of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights nevertheless 
does not infringe if the use qualifies as fair use. Fair use originated as a 
judge-made doctrine, and was only codified in the statute with the 
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, which took effect on January 1, 
1978. Section 107 of the Act sets out a nonexhaustive list of four factors 
that courts are to consider in determining whether any particular use 
qualifies as a fair use.1 
The Supreme Court’s most recent and sustained attention to 
copyright’s fair use doctrine came in 1994 in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.,2 a case in which the owner of the copyright in the musical 
work “Pretty Woman” (made famous in Roy Orbison’s recording) sued 
2 Live Crew for creating a rap version of the song. Academics and 
1 “In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to 
be considered shall include—  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
2. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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courts have paid substantial attention to the way the Supreme Court in 
Campbell developed the analysis of the first of the four statutory fair use 
factors and gave a prominent role to the question of whether a 
defendant’s allegedly infringing use was “transformative.”3 
This Article explores an aspect of the Campbell decision that has 
attracted less attention—the Court’s articulation of how courts should 
analyze the third fair use factor. That factor calls for considering “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used [by the defendant] in 
relation to the [plaintiff’s] copyrighted work as a whole.”4 In other 
words, how much of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work did the defendant 
use? And how substantial was the portion that the defendant used when 
compared to the plaintiff’s entire copyrighted work. 
Part I traces the relatively short history of fair use in the Supreme 
Court. Before Campbell, the Supreme Court had provided little guidance 
on how to apply factor three in the fair use analysis. Campbell filled that 
gap by announcing that the third factor calls for considering whether the 
defendant used a reasonable amount of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. 
The remainder of the Article looks at how this reasonableness analysis 
has fared in the circuit courts in the two decades since Campbell was 
decided. It studies the sixty-one post-Campbell appellate decisions that 
have engaged in fair use analysis. Part II details the methodology of the 
study and describes a number of general characteristics of appellate fair 
use decisions since Campbell. Part III looks specifically at the treatment 
of the third factor in the opinions in the study—both at how appellate 
courts weight that factor, and to what extent those courts expressly 
articulate Campbell’s reasonableness approach in their analysis. Finally, 
Part IV focuses on the relatively large portion of the appellate fair use 
decisions that involve a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s entire work. In 
particular, this Part argues that courts have used Campbell’s 
reasonableness approach in finding fair use when a defendant’s use of 
entire copyrighted works involves a relatively new technological use. 
I. FACTOR THREE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
A. Fair Use Cases Before Campbell 
Before the Campbell decision, only three Supreme Court opinions 
addressed the application of Section 107’s factors to a fair use claim. In 
3. Id. at 578–81. 
4. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
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Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,5 owners of 
copyrights in movies and television shows charged the makers and 
distributors of videocassette recorders (VCRs) with liability for 
copyright infringement allegedly committed when the defendants’ 
customers used their VCRs to record television programming broadcast 
over the air. In deciding the case, the Court considered whether VCR 
users were engaged in noninfringing fair use.6 In Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,7 the Court considered fair use in 
the context of a claim that the magazine The Nation infringed when, 
shortly before the publication of former President Gerald R. Ford’s 
memoir, the magazine published an article that quoted passages from the 
memoir without permission.8 And in Stewart v. Abend,9 the Court 
considered whether the continued showing of Alfred Hitchcock’s movie 
Rear Window infringed on the copyrighted short story on which the 
movie was based once the license to use the short story expired. The 
“amount and substantiality” of the guidance that each of those opinions 
provided on the application of the third factor was relatively modest. 
1. Sony 
The first of the three pre-Campbell opinions only briefly addressed 
how to consider the “amount . . . of the portion used” by the defendant in 
comparison to the plaintiff’s entire work.10 The 1984 decision in Sony 
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,11 the Supreme Court’s 
first interpretation of Section 107, considered whether “time shifting” a 
television program using a VCR was fair use. The Court defined time 
shifting as recording a television show when it was broadcast by an 
over-the-air television station and then later watching the recorded 
program and erasing it.12 The Court concluded that a VCR user’s time-
shifting constituted fair use.13 
The Sony majority opinion offered little analysis of the third factor. 
Indeed, the majority analyzed both the second and third factors together 
5. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
6. Id. at 447–56. 
7. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
8. Id. at 542–43. 
9. 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
10. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
11. 464 U.S. 417. 
12. Id. at 421. 
13. Id. at 455–56. 
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in a single sentence: 
Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised 
copyrighted audiovisual work, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982 
ed.), and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a 
work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of 
charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), 
does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding 
of fair use.14 
This brief discussion did, nonetheless, offer some guidance on how to 
apply the third factor, particularly with respect to the “amount” (or 
quantity) of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work that the defendant had used. 
The Court announced, perhaps not surprisingly, that ordinarily, if a 
defendant copied the plaintiff’s entire work, then the third factor would 
weigh against the defendant’s claim of fair use.15 The Court also made 
clear, though, that Section 107(3) did not establish an invariable rule that 
whenever the defendant copied the whole work, the third factor would 
count against the defendant’s fair use claim.16 Instead, the Court, in 
deciding that time-shifting constituted fair use, demonstrated that courts 
evaluating factor three should recognize that in some situations a 
defendant could even use a plaintiff’s entire work and still qualify for 
fair use.17 
We can think of factor three as asking, in part, “Has the defendant 
used ‘too much’ of the plaintiff’s work?” The Sony Court made clear 
that when the defendant has used all of the plaintiff’s work, the answer 
to the question will ordinarily be “yes,” but nevertheless will sometimes 
be “no.”18 Unfortunately, the Sony opinion offered little guidance, 
beyond the particular facts of that case, on how to decide when the use 
of the entire work had its ordinary effect of weighing against fair use, 
and when use of the entire work was nevertheless consistent with finding 
the defendant’s use fair. Using the entire work was clearly okay if the 
defendant was engaged in time-shifting, but nothing in the Sony opinion 
helps much in deciding in what other circumstances a defendant’s use of 
the whole copyrighted work might be acceptable under factor three. 
14. Id. at 449–50. 
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
17. Id. 
18. Id.  
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2. Harper & Row 
A year after Sony, the Court in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. 
Nation Enterprises19 again considered how to apply Section 107’s 
factors to a fair use claim. The Nation had published an article about 
former President Gerald R. Ford’s forthcoming memoir, A Time to Heal, 
shortly before the book was published.20 The Court’s discussion of 
factor three gave little help in understanding how courts should answer 
that factor’s quantitative question of whether the defendant used “too 
much.”21 The Nation took only 300 to 400 words of the 200,000-word 
book manuscript.22 The Second Circuit, whose decision the Court was 
reviewing, had concluded that the defendants “took a meager, indeed an 
infinitesimal amount of Ford’s original language.”23 The Court itself 
observed that “[i]n absolute terms, the words actually quoted were an 
insubstantial portion” of Ford’s work.24 On the facts, the Court implied 
that, on a quantitative reckoning, factor three would generally favor, or 
at least not weigh against, fair use. 
The Court, however, immediately approvingly quoted the district 
court’s conclusion that the defendants “took what was essentially the 
heart of the book.”25 The Court thus made clear that in evaluating factor 
three, courts must consider “the portion used” by the defendant both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.26 This seems consistent with the 
statutory directive to consider both the “amount” and “substantiality” of 
what the defendant used.27 Even if a defendant took only a small 
quantitative amount from the plaintiff’s work, factor three might still 
weigh against fair use if the portion that the defendant used was 
qualitatively substantial, particularly if it was the “heart” of the work.28 
The Court had more to say about quantitative analysis, too. Even 
though The Nation copied a portion of Ford’s memoir that was 
quantitatively insignificant in relation to Ford’s entire memoir, the Court 
19. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
20. Id. at 542. 
21. Id. at 564–66. 
22. Id. at 539, 565 & n.8. 
23. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 209 (2d Cir. 1983). 
24. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. 
25. Id. at 564–65 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 
1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
26. Id. at 564–65. 
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
28. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–66. 
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also considered how much of the magazine’s article was made up of 
material copied from Ford.29 The language of Section 107(3) requires 
looking at the “‘amount’ . . . of the portion used” by the defendant “in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”30 and the entire context of 
Section 107 makes clear that the term “the copyrighted work” refers to 
the plaintiff’s copyrighted work which the defendant has allegedly 
infringed. The Harper & Row Court went beyond the statutory language 
to consider “the portion used” by the defendant in relation to the 
defendant’s own allegedly infringing work as a whole.31 The Court 
asserted that “the fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work 
was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied 
material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist.”32 Thus, the Court 
decided that looking at what proportion (how much) of the defendant’s 
own accused work she had copied from the plaintiff’s work could help 
determine whether what the defendant took from the copyrighted work 
was a qualitatively substantial portion of the plaintiff’s entire 
copyrighted work. 
In Harper & Row, according to the Court, the defendant’s “direct 
takings from the unpublished [Ford] manuscript constitute at least 13% 
of the infringing article” in The Nation, and the article was “structured 
around the quoted excerpts which serve as its dramatic focal points.”33 
The Court concluded that the portions of the Ford memoirs that The 
Nation copied played a “key role” in its article.34 Given the qualitative 
importance of the portions of the plaintiff’s work that the defendants 
copied, the Court appears to have concluded that the third factor 
weighed against a finding of fair use. 
Harper & Row thus established that in evaluating factor three, quality 
matters as well as quantity. It also showed that a defendant who uses 
29. Id. at 565. 
30. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (emphasis added). 
31. 471 U.S. at 565–66. The Court observed that “the statutory language indicates” that “a taking 
may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work.” Id. at 
565. Presumably the Court means that even if the portion copied by the defendant is insubstantial as 
a portion of the defendant’s own work, factor three could still weigh against fair use if the portion 
the defendant used is significant as a portion of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, since the language 
of factor three focuses attention on the portion used in relation to “the copyrighted work as a 
whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). That statutory language itself, however, does not necessarily imply the 
converse that the Court drew in Harper & Row, that if the portion the defendant used is a relatively 
significant portion of the defendant’s infringing work, then the portion used is of qualitative value. 
32. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
33. Id. at 565–66. 
34. Id. at 566. 
 
                                                     
11 - Reese - Final, with RAR edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:30 PM 
762 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:755 
even a quantitatively insignificant portion of a copyrighted work may 
find this factor ranged against her if that portion is qualitatively 
important. And it made clear that in determining the qualitative value of 
the portion the defendant copied, a court could look, at least in part, at 
what proportion of the defendant’s own accused work is made up of 
material copied from the plaintiff’s work.35 
3. Stewart v. Abend 
The Court’s final fair use case before Campbell, Stewart v. Abend,36 
added little to the Court’s factor three jurisprudence. Without much 
analysis, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted short story “It Had to Be Murder” was a 
“substantial portion” of defendant’s movie Rear Window, because the 
movie “expressly uses the story’s unique setting, characters, plot, and 
sequence of events.”37 The Court apparently viewed this as at least a 
qualitatively substantial portion, as it compared it to the taking of the 
“heart” of the work in Harper & Row.38 The Court also dismissed the 
defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s “story constituted only 20% of 
the motion picture’s story line,” noting that “that does not mean that a 
substantial portion of the story was not used in the motion picture.”39 
4. Factor Three on the Eve of Campbell 
When the Court took up the Campbell case, it had said relatively little 
about how to evaluate factor three. If the defendant copied the plaintiff’s 
entire work, then the factor would generally, but not always, weigh 
against fair use. If the defendant copied a quantitatively insignificant 
portion of the plaintiff’s work, the factor could still weigh against fair 
use if the portion the defendant copied was qualitatively significant. And 
if what the defendant copied was a significant part of the defendant’s 
own work (and apparently thirteen percent amounted to a significant 
part), that might indicate that the copied portion was, indeed, a 
qualitatively important part of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work, so that 
factor three would weigh against fair use. 
Interestingly, the Court’s first two cases applying Section 107 
35. Id. at 569 (“[I]n finding the taking ‘infinitesimal,’ the Court of Appeals accorded too little 
weight to the qualitative importance of the quoted passages of original expression.”). 
36. 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
37. Id. at 238. 
38. Id.  
39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 
                                                     
11 - Reese - Final, with RAR edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:30 PM 
2015] CAMPBELL & THE THIRD FAIR USE FACTOR 763 
plumbed the quantitative extremes of how much of the plaintiff’s work 
the defendant had used. In Sony, the time-shifting viewer used the 
entirety of the plaintiff’s copyrighted television program, while in 
Harper & Row the magazine used about 0.2% of the plaintiff’s memoir. 
In each case, the Court suggested the ordinary effect of such extremes: 
copying the whole work would ordinarily militate against fair use, while 
copying only an insubstantial fraction of the work would not. But the 
Court also demonstrated clearly that even at the extremes, the weight of 
factor three was not determined by a simple quantitative calculation. 
Under certain circumstances, copying the entire work would not weigh 
against fair use (as it didn’t in Sony), and copying only a tiny 
quantitative portion could weigh against fair use (as it did in Harper & 
Row) if the portion was qualitatively significant. 
But beyond the extremes, the pre-Campbell decisions offered little 
guidance on how to analyze the statutory question about the quantity of 
what the defendant had copied from the plaintiff’s copyrighted work in 
relation to the plaintiff’s work as a whole. In other words, the opinions 
give no real guidance on how to answer the question, “Did the defendant 
take ‘too much’?” This is particularly true in those cases where the 
defendant took less than the entire work, but more than a miniscule 
fraction of it—cases one might expect would make up a significant 
portion of instances in which fair use claims must be assessed. 
B. Campbell’s Factor Three Analysis 
Campbell elaborated on the statutory language to offer courts a 
method of grappling with the basic quantitative question underlying the 
third factor—did the defendant take “too much”? 
At the very opening of Campbell’s discussion of the third factor, the 
Court framed the inquiry differently than it had in the previous cases. 
The statute simply states that “[i]n determining whether the use made of 
a work in any particular case” is fair, the “factors to be considered shall 
include . . . the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole.”40 But Justice Souter offered a 
subtly different version of the inquiry. He wrote: “The third factor asks 
whether ‘the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole,’ § 107(3) . . . are reasonable in 
relation to the purpose of the copying.”41 By adding these last ten words, 
Justice Souter provided a yardstick to use in evaluating the portion of the 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
41. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (emphasis added). 
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plaintiff’s work used by the defendant. 
The statutory factor itself just directs attention to the question of “how 
much” the defendant took and how valuable was the portion taken. 
Measuring the quantitative amount taken is generally a relatively 
straightforward proposition. In some instances, as in Sony, the answer is 
one hundred percent. In other instances, as in Harper & Row, the answer 
is 0.2%. And presumably in most instances the percentage will be 
somewhere in between those extremes. But the statutory articulation of 
the third factor does not direct a court what to do once it has calculated 
what proportion of the work the defendant used. 
The Campbell opinion’s approach picks up where the statute leaves 
off. In one short stroke, the Court made clear that analyzing the third 
factor did not involve drawing some absolute, or even proportionate, line 
of how much a defendant could and could not take from a copyrighted 
work. Rather, analysis of this factor called for a reasonableness inquiry, 
related to the purpose of the defendant’s use. Once a court has measured 
the quantitative and qualitative portion of the plaintiff’s work that the 
defendant has used, it can then proceed to evaluate whether the amount 
and substantiality of the defendant’s use counsel in favor of or against 
fair use. And that evaluation is made with reference to the purpose of the 
defendant’s copying. Campbell thus expressly links analysis of the third 
factor to the first factor (which looks to the “purpose and character” of 
the defendant’s use). This approach explains why copying the entire 
work did not weigh against fair use in Sony and why copying a very tiny 
fraction of the work did not weigh in favor of fair use in Harper & Row: 
“the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character 
of the use.”42 What impact the portion of the copyrighted work that the 
defendant took has on the fair use claim is to be evaluated, the Campbell 
Court explained, by asking whether what the defendant copied was 
reasonable in light of the purpose for the copying.43 
In applying this understanding of factor three to the case before it, the 
Court showed that inquiring into the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
use informed analysis of both the quantity and quality of what the 
defendant copied. The Court explained that when the defendant uses the 
plaintiff’s work for purposes of parody, the defendant “must be able to 
‘conjure up’ at least enough of [the plaintiff’s work] to make the object 
of [the parody’s] critical wit recognizable.”44 In speaking of “enough,” 
42. Id. at 586–87. 
43. Id. at 586. 
44. Id. at 588 (emphasis added). 
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the Court clearly is measuring the quantity of the defendant’s taking. 
The Court also observed, though, that “the heart [of the plaintiff’s work] 
is . . . what most readily conjures up the [work] for parody, and it is the 
heart at which parody takes aim,” so “[c]opying does not become 
excessive in relation to parodic purpose merely because the portion 
taken was the original’s heart.”45 In the dispute before it, the Court 
decided that the defendants copied, “no more [of the lyrics] . . . than 
necessary” and thus their copying could not be “excessive in relation to 
its parodic purpose even if the portion taken is the original’s ‘heart.’”46 
Thus, even when a defendant copies the “heart” of the plaintiff’s work—
that is, a qualitatively substantial portion of the plaintiff’s work—the 
copying may still be “reasonable in relation to the purpose of the 
copying” and thus may not weigh against fair use.47 
The Court’s approach in Campbell helps make sense of the Court’s 
fair use decision in Sony—the Court’s only case to affirm a finding of 
fair use. As a matter of simple quantitative measurement, the Sony case 
would seem to be a prime candidate for factor three to weigh against fair 
use, because the defendant used the plaintiff’s entire work. While the 
Sony Court ruled that a time-shifter’s recording of the entire work did 
not “have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use,”48 
its reason for that conclusion was fairly cryptic. The opinion merely 
noted “the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work” and “that 
time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had 
been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge.”49 The Campbell 
approach, by contrast, makes it easier to see why recording the entire 
work did not weigh against fair use: factor three isn’t concerned only 
with the quantitative measurement that the defendant used the entire 
work, but instead requires also considering the amount used in light of 
the VCR user’s time-shifting purpose. As the Sony Court described time-
shifting, the user’s purpose in recording a broadcast television program 
that “he cannot view as it is being televised” is “to watch it once at a 
later time.”50 The user would not be able to achieve that purpose without 
recording the entire program. Recording only the first or last twenty 
percent of the show, or recording every fifth minute, would be 
ineffective to accomplish the time-shifting goal. So recording the entire 
45. Id. (emphasis added). 
46. Id. at 589 (internal citations omitted). 
47. Id. at 586. 
48. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984). 
49. Id. at 449. 
50. Id. at 421. 
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program was reasonable in relation to the purpose of the user’s copying. 
II. FAIR USE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER CAMPBELL 
The approach to the third-factor inquiry that the Court announced in 
Campbell marked a substantial elaboration on its previous discussions of 
that factor. To see what effect, if any, this new approach has had in the 
lower courts, I studied the appellate caselaw on fair use in the years 
since Campbell was decided.51 This Part discusses the study 
methodology and the general characteristics of circuit court fair use 
opinions from 1994 to 2014.52 Parts III and IV then look more closely at 
how the appellate opinions have treated the third factor since Campbell. 
A. Methodology 
Searching on Westlaw for published circuit court opinions between 
1994 and 2014, inclusive, identified all those opinions that cited the 
statutory fair use provision, 17 U.S.C. § 107.53 I reviewed those opinions 
and eliminated those in which the court did not actually discuss the 
application of the statutory factors as well as those opinions which were 
superseded by amended opinions or vacated upon a grant of rehearing en 
banc. This resulted in a total of sixty-one circuit cases that discuss the 
application of Section 107’s factors to a claim of fair use. 
B. Distribution Among Circuit Courts 
These sixty-one fair use cases are not evenly divided among the 




51. This study takes a similar approach to that taken in my previous work. R. Anthony Reese, 
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008). It also 
follows on more extensive work studying fair use cases done by Barton Beebe, Neil Netanel, and 
Mat Sag. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 715 (2011); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012). 
52. None of the cases in the study were reviewed by the Supreme Court, which has not reviewed 
a fair use claim since Campbell.  
53. I searched federal appellate decisions in Westlaw using the search string “((17 +5 107) 
“section 107”) & copyright & DA (aft 03-01-1994)” to identify cases decided after Campbell that 
contain the word “copyright” and that include a citation to the statute’s fair use provision, either in 
full form (17 U.S.C. § 107) or in shortened form (“§ 107” or “section 107”). 
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Table 1 
Circuit Number of Opinions 
Ninth Circuit 20 
Second Circuit 15 
Fourth Circuit 5 
Seventh Circuit 5 
Sixth Circuit 4 
Eleventh Circuit 4 
First Circuit 2 
Third Circuit 2 
Fifth Circuit 1 
Eighth Circuit 1 
Tenth Circuit 1 
Federal Circuit 1 
D.C. Circuit 0 
 
Over half of the opinions come from the Ninth and Second Circuits 
combined, the only two circuits with more than five fair use opinions 
during the twenty years since Campbell was decided. More than half of 
the circuit courts decided two or fewer fair use cases during this period. 
To the extent that these numbers generally reflect the number of cases 
involving fair use claims brought in the district courts of these circuits, 
the appellate caselaw in the Ninth and Second Circuits will likely 
influence the largest number of fair use decisions. 
C. Distribution Over Time 
The rate of circuit court fair use decisions issued by circuit courts has 
remained relatively steady since the Court decided Campbell on March 
7, 1994. In each full five-year period since then, appeals courts decided 
between 11 and 17 cases applying the Section 107 factors to a fair use 
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Table 2 








So far, during the fifth five-year period after Campbell (starting in 
March 2014), four appellate fair use opinions have been issued. 
D. Procedural Posture of the District Court Decisions Reviewed 
The district court decisions on appeal in the cases in the study came at 
all stages of litigation, but most appeals were from grants of summary 
judgment. Four cases involved decisions at the pleading stage, including 
one granting a motion to strike a defendant’s affirmative defense of fair 
use54 and three dismissing complaints for failure to state a claim.55 
Another fourteen cases reviewed grants or denials of motions for a 
preliminary injunction.56 More than half of the appeals—thirty-three out 
of sixty-one cases—reviewed district court decisions made at the 
summary judgment stage.57 And ten cases involved appeals after trial, 
54. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003). 
55. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy 
Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
56. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014); Salinger v. Colting, 
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); 
NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 
349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 
(3d Cir. 2003); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 
2002); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 
214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. 
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 
F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 
57. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. 
v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d 
Cir. 2014); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, 
Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); SOFA Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 
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including seven bench trials58 and three jury trials.59 
E. Appellate Disposition of the District Court Decisions 
In most cases in the study (forty-one out of sixty-one), the court 
affirmed the decision below. In twenty cases, the appeals court affirmed 
a district court’s decision concluding that the defendant’s use was (or 
uses were) fair,60 while in twenty-one cases, the appeals court affirmed a 
decision below that the defendant’s use was not fair.61 Thirteen cases in 
F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 
29 (1st Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011); A.V. ex 
rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. 
World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. 
Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 
F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004); Mattel 
Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 
(9th Cir. 2003); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 
305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Davis v. 
Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); Worldwide Church 
of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters 
TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV 
Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 
1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
58. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens 
Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999); Infinity Broad. 
Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 
194 (4th Cir. 1998); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
59. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG 
Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 
F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004). 
60. Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932; HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87; Fox Broad. Co., 747 F.3d 1060; Kienitz, 
766 F.3d 756; Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd., 756 F.3d 73; Seltzer, 725 F.3d 1170; SOFA Entm’t, 
Inc., 709 F.3d 1273; iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630; Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Bill Graham Archives, 448 
F.3d 605; Brownmark Films, 682 F.3d 687; Compaq Computer Corp., 387 F.3d 403; NXIVM Corp., 
364 F.3d 471; Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d 792; Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Bond, 317 F.3d 385; L.A. News Serv., 
305 F.3d 924; Núñez, 235 F.3d 18; Sundeman, 142 F.3d 194; Leibovitz, 137 F.3d 109. 
61. Balsley, 691 F.3d 747; Gregory, 689 F.3d 29; Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; Bridgeport Music, Inc., 
585 F.3d 267; Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008); Zomba Enters., 
Inc., 491 F.3d 574; Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d 769; BMG Music, 430 F.3d 888; Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d 622; Video Pipeline, 
Inc., 342 F.3d 191; Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94; A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1004; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., 166 F.3d 65; Micro Star, 154 F.3d 1107; L.A. News Serv., 149 
F.3d 987; Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d 132; Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d 1394; Princeton Univ. 
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the study resulted in reversals or remands of the district court’s decision. 
In eight of these cases, the appeals court reversed a district court’s 
decision that the defendant’s use was (or uses were) fair;62 in five other 
cases, the appeals court reversed, reversed and remanded, or vacated and 
remanded a district court’s decision that the defendant’s use was not 
fair.63 And in one case, the appeals court vacated and remanded all of the 
district court’s decisions that some of the defendant’s uses were fair and 
some were not.64 Two cases involved mixed outcomes on appeal: the 
appeals court affirmed the district court’s finding that one use was fair, 
but either reversed, or vacated and remanded, the finding below that a 
second use was fair.65 And in the last four cases, the district court had 
not ruled on fair use but the appeals court did reach the issue. In three of 
those cases, the appeals court concluded that the defendant’s use was not 
fair,66 while in one case the appeals court concluded that the defendant’s 
use was fair.67 











Press, 99 F.3d 1381; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d 1330; Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d 913.  
62. Monge, 688 F.3d 1164; Murphy, 650 F.3d 295; Gaylord, 595 F.3d 1364; Mulcahy, 386 F.3d 
849; Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110; Infinity Broad. Corp., 150 F.3d 104; Ringgold, 126 
F.3d 70; L.A. News Serv., 108 F.3d 1119. 
63. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court and finding twenty-five 
uses fair; vacating and remanding as to five other uses); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 
F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).  
64. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).  
65. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (reversing determination of 
fair use as to highlight films); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 
Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating and remanding determination of fair use as to one 
count of infringement in complaint).  
66. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001). 
67. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Table 3 











Fair Use 20 8 2  30 
District Ct: 
Not Fair Use 21 5   26 
District Ct: 
Mixed  1   1 
District Ct: 
Didn’t Reach    
3: Not Fair 
1: Fair Use 4 
Totals 41 14 2 4 61 
 
F. Fair Use Outcomes on Appeal 
In terms of ultimate outcome on the question of fair use, in about half 
the cases—thirty in all—the appellate court concluded that the 
defendant’s use was (or uses were) not fair.68 In a little over a third of 
the cases (twenty four), the circuit court found the defendant’s use or 
uses to be fair.69 In three cases, the appellate court reached differing 
68. Diversey, 738 F.3d 1196; Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya 
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. 
v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d 
Cir. 2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009); 
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. 
Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 
447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); Chi. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 
F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d 
Cir. 2003); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 
2002); Davis, 246 F.3d 152; Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 
(9th Cir. 2000); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999); 
Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., v. Carol 
Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d 
Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss 
Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); L.A. News Serv. v. 
KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document 
Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 
1995); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
69. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th 
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decisions as to whether different uses by the defendants were fair.70 And 
in four cases the appeals court did not reach a decision on the merits of 
the fair use claim.71 
Table 4 summarizes the appellate fair use determinations, organized 
by procedural posture of the district court’s decision: 
 
Table 4 








on Appeal Totals 
Pleading 1 3   4 
Preliminary 
Injunction 6 8   14 
Summary 
Judgment 15 13 2 3 33 
Bench 
Trial 1 4 1 1 7 
Jury Trial 1 2   3 
Totals 24 30 3 4 61 
 
Cir. 2014); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. 
Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 
1170 (9th Cir. 2013); SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc. 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013); A.V. 
ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Brownmark Films, 
LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 
387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004); Mattel Inc. 
v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th 
Cir. 2003); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 
F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); 
Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., 214 
F.3d 1022; Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures 
Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
70. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court and finding twenty-five 
uses fair; vacating and remanding as to five other uses); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 
F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (reversing determination of fair use as to highlight films); Peter Letterese 
& Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1287 (vacating and remanding determination of fair use as to one count of 
infringement in complaint). 
71. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Mulcahy v. Cheetah 
Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 
2002); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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III. FACTOR THREE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS AFTER 
CAMPBELL 
Identifying the sixty-one circuit court opinions since 1994 that have 
engaged in analyzing the Section 107 factors allows an examination of 
how the Campbell Court’s reasonableness approach to factor three has 
been applied in subsequent fair use cases. This Part examines how courts 
in the two decades after Campbell weight the third factor in the overall 
fair use determination, analyze the reasonableness of the defendant’s use 
of the plaintiff’s work in light of her purpose, and decide what 
constitutes the plaintiff’s “work.” 
A. How to Weight Factor Three 
The Campbell Court framed the third-factor inquiry as requiring 
consideration of whether the portion of the plaintiff’s work that the 
defendant used was reasonable in light of the purpose for the defendant’s 
use. The Court did not expressly state, though, how a court should 
weight factor three after evaluating the portion against the purpose. The 
Court certainly implied that if the defendant has not used more than is 
reasonable for its purposes (at least for its legitimate purposes), this 
factor should not pose an obstacle to finding the defendant’s use to be 
fair. The Court did not say, though, whether in such instances factor 
three should weigh in favor of fair use. The circuit court opinions in the 
study display a general reluctance to weight this factor in favor of fair 
use, even when the court concludes that the amount used by the 
defendant was reasonable. 
Determining how circuit courts weight factor three is complicated by 
a tendency in the opinions not to state expressly how the court is 
weighting this factor. The sixty-one opinions in the study include sixty-
four different conclusive analyses of factor three.72 More than a quarter 
of the analyses—nineteen out of sixty-four—do not expressly state how 
the court weighted that factor in the overall fair use analysis.73 In five of 
72. In one opinion, the court expressly did not reach a result on the third factor given the 
preliminary state of the record before it. Suntrust, 268 F.3d 1257, leaving sixty remaining opinions. 
In four of those opinions, the court conducted two separate fair use analyses of different challenged 
uses. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932; Cariou 
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301. This results in sixty-four separate 
analyses.  
73. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d 1232; Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th 
Cir. 2014); HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (full-image uses); Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (finding fair use as to 
twenty-five uses); SOFA Entm’t, Inc., 709 F.3d 1273; Brownmark Films, LLC, 682 F.3d 687; 
Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; Bridgeport Music, Inc., 585 F.3d 267; iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630; BMG 
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those cases the courts found the defendant’s use fair,74 while in ten cases 
the court found the use was not fair,75 and in four cases, the court 
vacated and remanded for further proceedings.76 
Of the forty-five analyses that do expressly state some conclusion 
about the weight, nearly half—twenty-one—expressly found that the 
factor weighed against fair use.77 Most of the time, the court’s weighting 
of the factor in these cases was consonant with the ultimate conclusion 
as to fair use: in nineteen of those twenty-one analyses, the court ruled 
against the fair use claim. In one case the court found the use to be fair 
even though factor three weighed against fair use,78 and in one case it 
vacated and remanded the issue for further proceedings.79 
Music, 430 F.3d 888; Mulcahy, 386 F.3d 849; Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 
(7th Cir. 2003); Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d 512; Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Micro Star, 154 F.3d 1107; Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d 1394; 
Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d 1381; Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d 1330. An absence of any express 
weighting of all of the fair use factors might reflect the admonition in Campbell: “Nor may the four 
statutory factors be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.” 510 U.S. at 578. However, in several of 
these cases, including Cambridge University Press, SOFA Entertainment, iParadigms, Napster, Dr. 
Seuss, and Princeton University Press, the court does expressly weight at least one of the other 
factors.  
74. Kienitz, 766 F.3d 756; HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (full-image uses); SOFA Entm’t, Inc., 709 
F.3d 1273; Brownmark Films, LLC, 682 F.3d 687; iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630.  
75. Salinger, 607 F.3d 68; Bridgeport Music, Inc., 585 F.3d 267; BMG Music, 430 F.3d 888; Chi. 
Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d 624; Greenberg, 244 F.3d 1267; A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004; Micro 
Star, 154 F.3d 1107; Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d 1394; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d 1381; Triad 
Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d 1330.  
76. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d 1232; Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (vacating and remanding as to 
five uses); Mulcahy, 386 F.3d 849; Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d 512. 
77. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013); Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 
(6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); Soc’y of the Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium 
Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301 (analyzing use in highlight films); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music 
Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology 
Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 
F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 
2006); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); Merkos L’Inyonei 
Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Worldwide Church of God 
v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, 
Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 
1998); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Infinity 
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 
108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
78. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc., 203 F.3d 596. 
79. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1287. 
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Far fewer analyses—only nine—expressly stated that factor three 
weighed in favor of fair use.80 Again, the weighting of the third factor 
was generally consonant with the fair use outcome: of those nine 
analyses, all but two concluded that the use was fair.81 
Table 5 summarizes these statistics, with the figures in bold indicating 
the cases in which the court’s weighting of the third factor was 
consonant with its ultimate conclusion on fair use: 
 
Table 5 
 Use Found Fair Use Found Not Fair Remand Totals 
3 Favors 
FU 7 1 1 9 
3 Against 
FU 1 19 1 21 
 
Fifteen more analyses weighted factor three as favoring neither party. 
Ten of these expressly stated that the factor was neutral (or “of little 
consequence” or “little weight” in the overall analysis), or did not weigh 
against fair use,82 and in all of those cases the court found the 
defendant’s use was fair. Five analyses did not expressly weight the 
factor as neutral, but stated that the factor did not benefit one party, 
without stating that the factor did benefit the other party, thus indicating 
that the court viewed the factor as not favoring either party. One of these 
five opinions expressly stated that the defendant couldn’t benefit from 
factor three and concluded that the use was not fair,83 while four of the 
five opinions expressly stated that the factor didn’t favor or benefit the 
80. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (full-text searching); Cariou, 
714 F.3d 694 (factor expressly favors fair use for twenty-five challenged uses); Blanch v. Koons, 
467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 
2004); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. 
Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 
1998); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
81. The court found that the use was not fair in Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d 191. The court 
remanded the fair use question in Ringgold, 126 F.3d. 70. 
82. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014); Bouchat v. 
Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2014); Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 
747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Bouchat, 
619 F.3d 301 (lobby displays); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 
2002); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000). 
83. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001).  
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copyright owner (or was “little benefit” to the copyright owner),84 and 
all four of those cases resulted in a determination of fair use. Thus, 
determining that factor three was neutral was almost always consonant 
with an ultimate conclusion of fair use: in fourteen of the fifteen 
instances where the court viewed the factor as neutral, it ultimately 
found the defendant’s use fair. 
Overall, then, how consistent is a court’s weighting of the third factor 
with its ultimate ruling on fair use? That is, how likely is an appellate 
court to find fair use when the third factor weighs in favor of fair use, or 
against fair use when the third factor weighs against? In the thirty 
opinions in which the court expressly states how it is weighting the third 
factor and weights the factor in in favor of one party or the other (rather 
than as neutral), the court’s conclusion as to which party that factor 
favors generally mirrors the outcome of the overall fair use analysis. In 
twenty-six instances, the third factor favored the party that prevailed on 
the fair use issue,85 while in only two instances86 did the court weight the 
third factor in favor of the party who ultimately lost on fair use.87 (In two 
84. Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932 (historical exhibitions); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
85. In nineteen cases, factor three weighed against fair use and the use was ruled not to be fair. 
Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013); Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 
2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); Soc’y of the Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium 
Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301 (analyzing use in highlight films); Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music 
Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 
(6th Cir. 2007); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Elvis 
Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. 
Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church 
of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, 
Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 
1998); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Infinity 
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 
108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
In seven cases, factor three weighed in favor of fair use and the court ruled that the use was fair. 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (full-text searching); Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (factor expressly favors fair use 
for twenty-five challenged uses); Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Compaq Computer Corp., 387 F.3d 403; 
Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d 792; Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc., 214 F.3d 1022; Sundeman, 142 F.3d 
194.  
86. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (but of very 
little weight); Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d 191.  
87. In fifteen other cases, the court expressly weighted the third factor, but did so as neutral and 
not favoring either party. See text accompanying notes 82–84, supra. If a neutral finding on factor 
three is viewed as consistent with an ultimate determination that the use is fair, then the 
determination on factor three and the determination on fair use overall align in forty out of forty-
five analyses (cases cited in notes 82, 84, and 85, supra), with the outcome on factor three and fair 
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analyses, the court remanded without a definitive ruling on fair use in 
the appellate opinion.88) 
How did Campbell’s reasonableness approach interact with courts’ 
weighting of the third factor and ultimate determination of fair use? In 
approximately two-thirds (seventeen) of the twenty-four89 analyses in 
which the court found that factor three favored fair use or was neutral, 
the court’s analysis of factor three included some discussion of the 
reasonableness of what the defendant used from the plaintiff’s work in 
light of the purpose of the defendant’s use.90 In all seventeen of those 
instances, the court found the defendant’s use fair. Of course, in four 
other instances, the court found that factor three favored fair use or was 
neutral, and concluded that the defendant’s use was fair, without 
evaluating the reasonableness of the portion of the plaintiff’s work the 
defendant used in light of the defendant’s purpose.91 In the twenty-one 
analyses in which the court expressly weighted the third factor against 
fair use, the court’s analysis drew on Campbell’s reasonableness 
approach in only nine of those analyses.92 A court’s use of Campbell’s 
use diverging in only three of them (cases cited in notes 83 and 86, supra). (In two cases, cited in 
note 88, infra, the court did not reach the merits of the fair use claim.)  
88. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2008); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 80 (2d Cir. 1997). 
89. See notes 80 and 82–84, supra. 
90. Of the cases finding factor three favored fair use, the court discussed the reasonableness in 
light of the purpose in five of them. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (full text); Cariou, 714 F.3d 694; 
Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d 792; Sundeman, 142 F.3d 194. Of cases finding factor 
three neutral, that reasonableness was discussed in twelve analyses in those cases. Swatch Grp. 
Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. 
P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing reasonableness in analyzing use both in highlight 
films and historical displays); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Bouchat, 
619 F.3d 301 (lobby displays); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); NXIVM Corp. v. 
Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 
(9th Cir. 2002); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
91. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (factor doesn’t weigh 
against fair use); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004) (jury 
could reasonably conclude that factor favored fair use); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 
F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (does not help copyright owner); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. 
Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, in Video Pipeline and Davis, the court 
found factor three favored fair use or was neutral without discussing the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s taking, but nonetheless found that the use was not fair. In Ringgold, the court affirmed 
the district court’s conclusion that the third factor favored the defendants, but reversed and 
remanded the case for reconsideration of the fair use claim. Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70. 
92. The twenty-one analyses expressly weighting the third factor against fair use are cited in note 
77, supra. The court’s analysis drew on Campbell’s reasonableness approach in only nine of those 
analyses. Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 
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reasonableness approach is thus more strongly correlated with the court 
weighing of factor three in a way that favors fair use, or at least does not 
weigh against fair use. 
B. Analyzing the Reasonableness of the Portion Copied in Light of 
the Purpose for the Copying 
Just over half of the appellate opinions in the study actually state 
Campbell’s principle that the third factor should be analyzed by looking 
at the reasonableness of the defendant’s copying in light of her purpose. 
Of the sixty-one opinions, thirty-two93 of them quote or cite Campbell 
for this principle, or quote another circuit court opinion that quotes or 
paraphrases Campbell on this point.94 The remaining twenty-nine 
2012); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301 (analyzing 
use in highlight films); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1287; Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 
(9th Cir. 2003); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 
2000); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). The other twelve analyses did not 
discuss reasonableness.  
93. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., 
756 F.3d 73; HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87; Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932; Seltzer, 725 F.3d 1170; Cariou, 714 
F.3d 694; SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013); Gregory, 689 
F.3d 29; Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012); Bouchat, 619 
F.3d 301 ; Gaylord, 595 F.3d 1364; A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th 
Cir. 2009); Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d 1287; Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146; Blanch, 
467 F.3d 244; Wall Data Inc., 447 F.3d 769; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d 605; NXIVM Corp., 
364 F.3d 471; Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Mattel Inc., 353 
F.3d 792; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 
811 (9th Cir. 2003); Bond, 317 F.3d 385; L.A. News Serv., 305 F.3d 924; Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Núñez, 235 F.3d 18; Worldwide Church of 
God, 227 F.3d 1110; Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., 150 F.3d 132; Sundeman, 142 F.3d 194; Leibovitz, 
137 F.3d 109; Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d 913. 
94. I have counted in this number any opinion that quotes or paraphrases Campbell’s statement 
that the third factor asks whether the defendant’s copying is “reasonable in relation to the purpose of 
the copying,” 510 U.S. at 586, or its statement that “the extent of permissible copying varies with 
the purpose and character of the use,” id. at 586–87. I have also counted in this number any opinion 
that, while not directly quoting Campbell, quotes a lower court opinion that itself quotes or 
paraphrases language from Campbell about analyzing the portion the defendant used in light of her 
purpose. For example, a number of opinions, while not directly quoting Campbell, quote or 
paraphrase portions of Second Circuit opinions in Texaco, Castle Rock, Bill Graham Archives, or 
Blanch that refer to this aspect of the Campbell decision. See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (quoting 
Bill Graham Archives, Blanch); Núñez, 235 F.3d 18 (quoting Castle Rock); Soc’y of the Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc., 689 F.3d 29 (quoting Castle Rock); NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d 471 
(quoting Texaco); see also Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932 (quoting Sundeman); Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301 
(quoting Sundeman); L.A. News Serv., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 941 (“If the secondary user only copies as 
much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor will not weigh against him or her.” 
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opinions do not quote or cite, either directly or indirectly, Campbell’s 
command to analyze factor three by looking to the purpose of the 
defendant’s. 
The rate at which the appellate courts have cited or quoted Campbell 
(directly or indirectly) for this proposition has not changed much over 
time, as breaking the opinions down by five-year periods since the 
decision in Campbell shows. For the thirteen opinions issued in the five 
years between the date Campbell was decided (March 7, 1994) through 
March 7, 1999, five95 state the principle and eight96 don’t. Of the 
seventeen opinions issued from March 1999 to March 2004, nine97 state 
the principle and eight98 don’t. From March 2004 to March 2009, there 
are eleven opinions in the study, and six99 state the principle while 
five100 don’t. And of sixteen opinions between March 2009 and March 
(quoting Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 942 (9th Cir. 2002), superseded by 336 F.3d 811 
(9th Cir. 2003)) (emphasis added)). Finally, I have also included in this number the opinion in 
Chicago Board of Education, in which Judge Posner never quotes or cites Campbell either directly 
or indirectly for this point, but which simply states that “the fair use copier must copy no more than 
is reasonably necessary . . . to enable him to pursue an aim that the law recognizes as proper, in this 
case the aim of criticizing the copyrighted work effectively.” 354 F.3d at 629. 
95. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); Sundeman, 
142 F.3d 194; Leibovitz, 137 F.3d 109; Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d 1394; Am. Geophysical Union, 
60 F.3d 913. 
96. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999); Micro 
Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters TV Int’l, Ltd., 149 
F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); Ringgold, 
126 F.3d 70; L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1997); Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. 
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 
97. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d 624; Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d 792; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d 
622; Kelly, 336 F.3d 811; Bond, 317 F.3d 385; L.A. News Serv., 305 F.3d 924; Suntrust, 268 F.3d 
1257; Núñez, 235 F.3d 18; Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110. 
98. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Merkos 
L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Ty, Inc. v. 
Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
99. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 
(11th Cir. 2008); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Blanch v. 
Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th 
Cir. 2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); NXIVM 
Corp., 364 F.3d 471.  
100. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. 
Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2007); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2004); Compaq Computer 
Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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2014, nine101 state the principle, and seven102 don’t. (Four opinions were 
issued after March 2014, the beginning of the fifth five-year period since 
Campbell was decided; three103 state the principle and one104 doesn’t.) 
The following table summarizes these statistics. The figures in 
parentheses show the portion of the total cases in that five-year period 
represented by the absolute number. 
 
Table 6 
 State Principle Don’t State Principle Totals 
1994–1999 5 (38.5%) 8 (61.5%) 13 
1999–2004 9 (53%) 8 (47%) 17 
2004–2009 6 (54.5%) 5 (45.5%) 11 
2009–2014 9 (56%) 7 (44%) 16 
2014 3 1 4 
Totals 32 (52.5%) 29 (47.5%) 61 
 
Opinions concluding that a defendant’s use is fair are more likely to 
include an express discussion of the reasonableness inquiry established 
in Campbell. In twenty-eight of the sixty-one cases in the study, the 
appeals court either determined that some or all of the defendant’s uses 
were fair, or that the district court had erred in concluding that some or 
all of those uses were not fair.105 In twenty-two106 of these twenty-eight 
101. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, 
Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013); SOFA Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 2013); Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration 
Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy 
Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 
2010); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. 
iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).  
102. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014); Diversey v. 
Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013); Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. 
LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009).  
103. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. 
Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 
F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
104. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).  
105. In twenty cases, the appeals court affirmed a district court’s decision concluding that the 
defendant’s use was (or uses were) fair. See note 60, supra. In five cases, the appeals court reversed, 
reversed and remanded, or vacated and remanded a district court’s decision that the defendant’s use 
was not fair. See note 63, supra. In two cases with mixed outcomes on appeal, the appeals court 
affirmed the district court’s finding that one use was fair, but either reversed, or vacated and 
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cases, the court discussed the reasonableness of the portion used in light 
of the defendant’s purpose. (In three107 of these twenty-two cases, the 
court discussed the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s taking 
in the context of Campbell’s discussion of parody, which arguably 
provided a more specific test for analyzing the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s taking in that context.) Only six108 of these twenty-eight 
opinions did not expressly discuss that issue. 
By contrast, the opinions concluding that a defendant’s use was not 
fair were far less likely to analyze the portion of the work that the 
defendant used in light of the defendant’s purpose. In thirty-three of the 
sixty-one cases in the study, the appeals court either determined that 
some or all of the defendant’s uses were not fair, or that the district court 
had erred in concluding that some or all of those uses were fair.109 Only 
ten110 of these thirty-three opinions include some discussion of whether 
remanded, the finding below that a second use was fair. See note 65, supra. And in one case, 
although the district court had apparently not ruled on fair use, the appeals court reached the issue 
and concluded that the defendant’s use was fair, or was likely fair. See note 67, supra. 
106. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., 756 F.3d 73; HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87; Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932; 
Seltzer, 725 F.3d 1170; Cariou, 714 F.3d 694; SOFA Entm’t, Inc., 709 F.3d 1273; Brownmark 
Films, LLC, 682 F.3d 687; Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301; iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630; Peter Letterese & 
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 
2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); NXIVM 
Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 
(9th Cir. 2003); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 
385 (4th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News 
Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
107. Brownmark Films, LLC, 682 F.3d 687; Suntrust, 268 F.3d 1257; Leibovitz, 137 F.3d 109. 
108. Kienitz, 766 F.3d 756; Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 
2014); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns 
Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 
596 (9th Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
109. In twenty-one cases, the appeals court affirmed a decision below that the defendant’s use 
was not fair. See note 61, supra. In eight cases, the appeals court reversed a district court’s decision 
that the defendant’s use was (or uses were) fair. See note 62, supra. In three cases, while the district 
court had not ruled on fair use, the appeals court did reach the issue and concluded that the 
defendant’s use was not fair. See note 66, supra. And in one case, the appeals court vacated and 
remanded all of the district court’s decisions that some of the defendant’s uses were fair and some 
were not. See note 64, supra.  
110. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Soc’y of the Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012); Gaylord v. United States, 
595 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 
2006); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Elvis Presley Enters. v. 
Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 
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the defendant used a reasonable portion of the copyrighted work in light 
of the defendant’s purpose, while the other twenty-three of these 
opinions include no real discussion of Campbell’s reasonableness 
inquiry. 
This correlation obviously does not directly reveal anything about 
causation. Perhaps analyzing a defendant’s use in light of her purpose 
makes it more likely for a court to conclude that the defendant’s use is 
fair. Or perhaps a court that concludes that a defendant’s use is fair is 
more likely to justify that conclusion in part by analyzing the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s use in light of her purpose. In 
whichever direction the causation runs, appellate opinions concluding 
that a defendant’s use is fair are more likely to discuss the third factor 
under Campbell’s reasonableness rubric than are opinions concluding 
that a defendant’s use was not fair. 
C. Illegitimate Purposes 
One question raised by the Campbell approach is how the analysis 
should proceed if the amount the defendant used is reasonable in light of 
the defendant’s purpose but that purpose is itself not one that favors 
treating the defendant’s use as fair. To take the extreme example, if the 
defendant’s purpose is merely to outcompete the plaintiff in sales of 
verbatim copies of the plaintiff’s work by selling copies more cheaply, 
the defendant can’t effectively achieve that purpose without copying the 
plaintiff’s entire work. But it hardly seems that the third factor should 
weigh in favor of fair use (or even be neutral) just because the defendant 
took no more than necessary to achieve her illegitimate purpose. 
While the issue has (perhaps not surprisingly) not arisen quite that 
starkly in the reported appellate decisions in the study, at least some 
opinions have expressly grappled with how to treat the third factor when 
the defendant’s purpose is not one that favors fair use. Society of the 
Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory111 involved a 
defendant who had posted on his website excerpts from the plaintiff’s 
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 
132 (2d Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 
1997); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). The opinions in 
Gregory, Gaylord, Castle Rock, and Dr. Seuss all quote or cite Campbell (directly or indirectly) on 
reasonableness, but the court in each case offers no real analysis of the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s use in light of her purpose. Indeed, in Gregory, Castle Rock, and Dr. Seuss, the court 
seems to weigh factor three against the defendant because the court had concluded that the 
defendant’s purpose did not weigh in favor of fair use. Gregory, 689 F.3d at 63; Castle Rock, 150 
F.3d at 144; Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1402–03. 
111. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29. 
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translations of ancient religious texts. The First Circuit, in considering 
the first fair use factor, determined that “the [defendant’s] translations 
hold the same purpose and benefit as the [plaintiff’s] Works, i.e., to 
further religious practice and education.”112 The court concurred with the 
view of other courts that “where a copy’s ‘use is for the same intrinsic 
purpose [as the copyright holder’s] . . . such use seriously weakens a 
claimed fair use,’”113 and ultimately concluded that the first factor 
weighed against fair use.114 In considering the third factor, the court 
noted the need “to determine whether copying is ‘consistent with or 
more than necessary to further “the purpose and character of the 
use.”’”115 In making that evaluation, the court concluded that “[b]ecause 
the [defendant’s] use here was ‘for the same intrinsic purpose for which 
[the Monastery] intended it to be used,’ this third factor weighs against 
his contention of fair use.”116 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a similar approach to the third factor. In 
Wall Data, where the defendant had installed the plaintiff’s software on 
substantially more computers than its license from the plaintiff allowed, 
the court, in analyzing the third factor, concluded that “although ‘entire 
verbatim reproductions are justifiable where the purpose of the work 
differs from the original,’ [the defendant] put its copies to the exact 
purpose for which the original software licenses were purchased.”117 In 
Worldwide Church of God,118 where the defendant made and distributed 
complete copies of the defendant’s entire 380-page religious text, the 
court considered the third factor in light of Campbell’s admonition that 
“[t]he extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and 
character of the use.”119 But the majority (like the First Circuit in 
Gregory) concluded that “the purpose for which [the defendant] uses the 
[plaintiff’s work] is the same as [the plaintiff’s]”120 and that therefore the 
112. Id. at 60. The court noted that the defendant’s works, in Campbell’s words, “merely 
supersede[] the object[] of the original creation.” Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
113. Id. (quoting Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989)).  
114. Id. at 61 (“[W]e conclude that as to the first factor, the scales tip in the Monastery’s favor.”). 
115. Id. at 63 (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
586–87). 
116. Id. at 63 (quoting Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
117. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mattel 
Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
118. 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). 
119. Id. at 1118 (quoting Campbell). 
120. Id.  
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third factor weighed against fair use.121 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that despite Campbell’s 
principle that “‘the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose 
and character of the use[,]’ [u]nless the use is transformative, the use of 
a copyrighted work in its entirety will normally weigh against a finding 
of fair use.”122 In a later opinion, the Fourth Circuit summarized the 
third-factor inquiry in a way that again stressed that the defendant’s 
purpose must not be illegitimate. “If the [defendant] reproduces only the 
amount necessary to achieve a valid end, this factor will favor neither 
party.”123 And the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that while the inquiry 
into whether the portion of the work that the defendant used is 
“‘reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying’ [is] not limited to 
the context of transformative uses,”124 nevertheless “the wholesale 
reproduction of an entire work will not generally be considered fair use 
unless the use is highly transformative.”125 
These statements all indicate that in evaluating the reasonableness of 
the defendant’s copying in light of her purpose, a court should consider 
(as it presumably did when evaluating the first factor) the legitimacy of 
that purpose, including whether the defendant’s purpose is simply the 
same as the plaintiff’s. Of course, a defendant’s use for a purpose that is 
illegitimate for fair use—such as making wholesale verbatim copies of 
the plaintiff’s work to sell or give away in competition with plaintiff—is 
unlikely to qualify as transformative or otherwise to weigh in favor of 
fair use under factor one. As a result, even if the defendant has copied no 
more than necessary to achieve that illegitimate purpose, that does not 
mean that the court should or would treat factor three as favoring fair 
use, or even as neutral in the overall fair use determination. 
D. What Is “the Copyrighted Work”? 
The evaluation of the third fair use factor may depend in part on how 
the court identifies “the copyrighted work” against which to compare the 
portion that the defendant used. Professor Paul Goldstein offers the 
example of a defendant who copies one episode of the popular television 
series 24, and asks whether each episode is a relevant “work,” or 
121. Id. 
122. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994)). 
123. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 949 (4th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
124. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1272 (11th Cir. 2014). 
125. Id. at 1274. 
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whether “the relevant work [is] bounded by the single twenty-four-hour 
day that aggregates the interlocking episodes.”126 He notes that “[f]air 
use . . . may come out differently if the copied episode of 24 is treated as 
the entire copyrighted work or as only one twenty-fourth of the 
copyrighted work.”127 
Professor Goldstein observes that on the general question of what 
constitutes a “work” (which has implications beyond the fair use 
analysis) “the statute is not instructive, and the cases reveal little analysis 
of the question and even less that is helpful.”128 The fair use cases in the 
study add relatively little to our understanding of how to define the 
copyrighted “work.” Few of these cases resolve disputes between the 
parties over the proper characterization of what constitutes the plaintiff’s 
“copyrighted work” for purposes of measuring how much of that work 
the defendant has used. Most courts that have ruled on the issue have 
rejected arguments that, for purposes of analysis under factor three, the 
plaintiff’s work should be considered to be a larger whole, rather than 
smaller constituent parts.129 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.130 involved 
photocopying of individual articles from scientific journals. In analyzing 
factor three, the court considered whether the plaintiff’s work was 
properly understood as each individual article, or as each issue of the 
scientific journal (containing multiple articles). The court concluded that 
each of the eight articles [copied] was separately authored and 
constitutes a discrete “original work[] of authorship.” [E]ach 
article enjoys independent copyright protection . . . , and what 
the publishers claim has been infringed is the copyright that 
subsists in each individual article—not the distinct copyright 
that may subsist in each journal issue or volume by virtue of the 
publishers’ original compilation of these articles.131 
126. Paul Goldstein, What Is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does It Matter?, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (2011). 
127. Id.  
128. Id. at 1177. 
129. A similar issue was raised recently in Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 
(11th Cir. 2014), involving placing copies of academic literature on electronic reserve for university 
students to read. The copyright owners in that case argued that for edited academic volumes 
consisting of several chapters each written by a separate author, the “work” for purposes of factor 
three analysis should be each chapter, rather than the entire volume. The Eleventh Circuit did not 
reach the merits of the claim, however, because it concluded that the publishers had raised the issue 
too late in the proceedings below for it to be considered.  
130. 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
131. Id. at 926. 
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Society of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory132 
similarly involved a compilation of literary works—in that case 
translations of ancient religious texts. The defendant in that case argued 
that his copying of an entire homily of St. Isaac involved “only one of 
seventy-seven homilies in the St. Isaac work, which is only 3 pages in a 
work that [is] 568 pages or approximately a half percent of the entire 
work.”133 The court rejected that argument and evaluated the defendant’s 
copying as “identical or near-verbatim copies of the [plaintiff’s] 
Works—themselves parts of greater texts, but which alone may be 
qualitatively significant.”134 
Similarly, in two cases in which defendants used photographs, 
appellate courts found that the defendant had used the plaintiff’s entire 
work and rejected the argument that the photo or photos used were a 
smaller part of a larger compilation. In Balsley v. LFP, Inc.,135 the court 
rejected an argument that the defendant had used less than the entire 
work because the defendant had reprinted only one of several of the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted photographs that had appeared on a website.136 
Similarly, the majority in Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc.137 rejected an 
argument that the defendant had used only a small portion of the 
plaintiff’s work when it published six entire photographs of the 
plaintiff’s wedding from among 400 photographs stored on the memory 
card from which it acquired the photos.138 The majority wrote that 
“[e]ach of the individual wedding photos is a separate work because 
each photo ‘can live [its] own copyright life’ and ‘has an independent 
economic value and is, in itself, viable.’”139 The majority determined 
that the “random collection of unidentified, non-wedding related 
images” on the memory card did not qualify as a compilation, of which 
the copied photographs were merely a small portion, because there was 
no evidence that the 400 images had been selected, coordinated, or 
arranged in any way.140 
One case, however, rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to persuade the court 
132. 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012). 
133. Id. at 62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134. Id. at 63. 
135. 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2012). 
136. Id. at 760. 
137. 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012). 
138. Id. at 1179–80. 
139. Id. at 1180 (quoting Columbia Pictures TV, Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 
F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001)).  
140. Id. at 1179–80. 
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to consider smaller portions of a work as each constituting a separate 
work. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute141 involved the plaintiffs’ 265-page 
course manual for its training seminars; the defendants quoted from the 
manual in two reports criticizing the plaintiffs’ seminars. With respect to 
factor three of the fair use analysis, the plaintiffs argued for 
“conceptualizing the single course manual as separate ‘modules,’ each of 
which they urge is a separate denominator” against which to calculate 
the amount of their work that the defendant used.142 “Applying this 
analysis, plaintiffs allege that defendants copied some entire works.”143 
The court rejected this approach: 
If plaintiffs’ argument were accepted by courts—and, not 
surprisingly, plaintiffs cite no authority to support it—the third 
factor could depend ultimately on a plaintiff’s cleverness in 
obtaining copyright protection for the smallest possible unit of 
what would otherwise be a series of such units intended as a 
unitary work. The proper analogy in this case is not to separate 
articles in a magazine, but instead to a book by a single author 
containing numerous chapters, which are not separately 
copyrightable. The “modules” in this case were written by the 
same author and they combine to produce one unitary work.144 
The court was unwilling to break down what it viewed as a single 
work by a single author into constituent parts for purposes of the factor 
three analysis, viewing as inapplicable the approach taken in Texaco, in 
which each article separately written by a different author was viewed as 
a different work, even though they appeared in a scientific journal issue 
containing multiple articles.145 
In Chicago Board of Education v. Substance, Inc.,146 which involved 
wholesale copying of standardized tests, the parties do not appear to 
have actually disputed what constituted the plaintiff’s work, but Judge 
Posner ventured his own opinion that part of the reason why copying an 
entire work is not per se unfair has to do with the potential 
manipulability of what constitutes “the work.” He noted that the 
141. 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004). 
142. Id. at 481. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. (citation omitted). The court cited its earlier opinion in American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925–26 (2d Cir. 1994) for the proposition that treating individual articles 
in a scientific journal as the relevant “work” was appropriate when the author of each article is 
different. 
145. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 925–26. 
146. 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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difficulties with a per se rule “would be obvious if the school board had 
copyrighted each question separately, as it might well have done, since it 
wants to reuse questions without necessarily reusing an entire test.”147 
Overall, then, courts appear to be alert to the potential for 
manipulation on both sides in identifying the plaintiff’s “work,” but they 
have dealt with the issue on a case-by-case basis without establishing 
general rules. In the few cases that have expressly considered what 
constitutes the plaintiff’s “copyrighted work” for purposes of the third 
fair use factor, courts have generally been disinclined to accept 
arguments that what the defendant copied should be viewed as only a 
small part of a larger work. But courts have also seemed suspicious of 
arguments by copyright owners that the court views as attempts to 
manipulate the definition of the “work” primarily for the purpose of 
affecting the analysis of the third fair use factor. 
E. Summary 
Examining post-Campbell appellate fair use opinions reveals several 
features of the third factor analysis. When courts expressly weight factor 
three, the weighting is generally consonant with the decision on the fair 
use claim. Only about half of the opinions expressly discuss the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s use in light of her purpose, but 
opinions finding the defendant’s use fair are more likely to discuss 
reasonableness than those that don’t. Where the court views the 
defendant’s purpose as not legitimate (or not favoring fair use), factor 
three will not favor fair use even if the defendant has used no more than 
reasonable for that purpose. And when disputes arise over what 
constitutes the plaintiff’s “work” against which the defendant’s portion 
used should be measured, courts tend to resist efforts to characterize the 
plaintiff’s work as a larger unit than what the defendant copied. 
IV. FACTOR THREE AND “ENTIRE WORK” CASES 
This Part looks more closely at cases in which the defendant used the 
plaintiff’s entire work. Some might be skeptical that use of the copyright 
owner’s entire work could ever be fair. Congress, though, when it 
enacted Section 107, expressly contemplated that in some circumstances 
the use of the entire work would qualify as fair use.148 In the principal 
147. Id. at 629. 
148. See Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 840–43 
(2015), elsewhere in this symposium. 
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committee report on the bill that became the 1976 Copyright Act, the 
drafters gave a number of examples of uses that they deemed to be fair 
under the bill’s provisions and that involved copying an entire work.149 
These examples included duplicating feature films that existed only in 
physically deteriorating prints, as well as making copies in forms “such 
as copies in Braille and phonorecords of oral readings (talking books)” 
that are “needed for the use of blind persons.”150 Campbell’s 
reasonableness approach seems likely to be particularly important in 
determining fair use where a defendant has used all, or essentially all, of 
a plaintiff’s copyrighted work. Since use of the entire work ordinarily 
militates against finding fair use,151 Campbell’s approach can help 
identify when such use does not have that ordinary effect. 
A surprising number of cases in the study involved use of the 
plaintiff’s entire work. While it can sometimes be difficult to be certain 
from the court opinions whether the defendant has used the entire work, 
it appears that more than half of the sixty-one cases in the study, thirty-
four of them,152 involved claims that the defendant had used the 
plaintiff’s entire copyrighted work. This Part looks more closely at the 
“entire work” cases. After considering how courts weight factor three in 
such cases, this Part looks at the fair use outcome in these cases and 
examines those outcomes in cases involving different types of 
copyrighted works. Finally, this Part concludes by looking at how 
Campbell’s reasonableness analysis has generally led courts to find fair 
use when a defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s entire work is enabled by a 
new technology. 
A. Weighting Factor Three in Entire Work Cases 
As discussed in Part III.A, few courts have expressly weighted factor 
three in favor of fair use. When the defendant has used the plaintiff’s 
entire work, courts seem particularly reluctant to weight factor three in 
favor of fair use, even where the court concludes that it was reasonable 
149. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 65–74 (1976). 
150. Id. at 73; see also id. at 71 (guidelines for educational uses of music suggesting that it would 
be fair use to copy entire work “to replace purchased copies which for any reason are not available 
for an imminent performance” and to record a performance by students for evaluation); id. at 68 
(guidelines for classroom copying indicating that making multiple copies for classroom use of “a 
complete poem if less than 250 words” or of “a complete article, story or essay of less than 2,500 
words” could be fair use, and indicating that a single copy for a teacher’s use of an entire chapter, 
periodical article, or short story could be a fair use). 
151. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984). 
152. These cases are identified in notes 165–168, infra.  
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for the defendant to use the whole work. Indeed, in 2006 the Second 
Circuit wrote in the Bill Graham Archives case that 
[n]either our court nor any of our sister circuits has ever ruled 
that the copying of an entire work favors fair use. At the same 
time, however, courts have concluded that such copying does 
not necessarily weigh against fair use because copying the 
entirety of a work is sometimes necessary to make fair use of an 
image.153 
The Second Circuit has repeated that assertion a number of times, most 
recently in May 2014.154 
The Second Circuit’s statement seems to reflect the general approach 
in “entire work” cases, not just in its own cases, but also in the Ninth 
Circuit. In a case where an image search engine copied entire images 
posted online, that court determined that “although [the defendant] did 
copy each of [the plaintiff’s] images as a whole, it was reasonable to do 
so in light of [the defendant’s] use of the images.”155 But the court 
concluded that therefore “[t]his factor neither weighs for nor against 
either party.”156 More recently, the Ninth Circuit stated that “this court 
has acknowledged that this [third] factor will not weigh against an 
alleged infringer, even when he copies the whole work, if he takes no 
more than is necessary for his intended use.”157 
The reluctance to weight factor three in favor of fair use when the 
defendant has used the entire work is not, however, as absolute as 
suggested by the court in Bill Graham Archives. Even before that case, 
at least one circuit court had in fact found that the third factor favored 
fair use even though the defendant had used the entire work. Sundeman 
v. The Seajay Society, Inc.158 involved a claim of infringement in the 
unpublished first novel by author Marjorie Rawlings. The defendant, 
who possessed the unpublished manuscript, copied the entire novel for a 
scholar who used it to prepare a review of the book.159 The Fourth 
153. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006). 
154. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014). 
155. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (following Kelley). 
156. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. 
157. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (citing 
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820–21). 
158. 142 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1998). 
159. The defendant also made a copy of nearly the entire manuscript in order to have the 
manuscript’s authenticity verified by the University of Florida. Other challenged uses by the 
defendant involved use of much smaller portions of the manuscript. Id. at 199. 
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Circuit concluded that the defendant copied no more of the manuscript 
than was necessary to allow the scholar to prepare her review without 
damaging the fragile original manuscript, and held that “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion copied by Seajay weigh in favor of finding 
the uses fair.”160 While the court’s conclusion as to the third factor 
involved several different challenged uses, only one of which involved 
the entire work, the court nonetheless found the factor favored fair 
use.161 
Most recently, in its June 2014 opinion in Authors Guild, Inc. v. 
HathiTrust,162 the Second Circuit itself seems to have departed from the 
approach announced in Bill Graham Archives. The defendant in 
HathiTrust copied entire works (primarily books) and did so on an 
enormous scale, ultimately scanning more than ten million items in the 
library collections of the many major research universities who are 
members of the defendant HathiTrust.163 The defendant used the entire 
verbal content of all of these works to enable full-text searching to locate 
whether and where particular words appeared in any of the books in the 
libraries. The court concluded that the defendants had used no more of 
the plaintiffs’ works than necessary and at the end of its discussion of 
factor three stated that “this factor favors the Libraries.”164 
Overall, then, in cases where the defendant has used the entire work, 
the general approach appears to be that if the defendant used a 
reasonable amount in light of her purpose, the third factor will not weigh 
against fair use but will be viewed as neutral, although at least two cases 
appear to weigh reasonable use of entire works in favor of fair use. 
B. Analyzing Defendant’s Use of the Plaintiff’s Entire Work 
More than half of the sixty-one cases in the study, thirty-four of them, 
160. Id. at 206. 
161. In a later case, the Fourth Circuit found that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s entire work 
(in that case, a logo for a professional football team) was reasonable in light of the defendant’s 
transformative purpose. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 315 (4th Cir. 2010). The 
court explained that “[h]owever, because the entire work is displayed [by the defendant], we decline 
to weigh the third factor in favor of fair use.” Id. Therefore, the court weighed this factor as 
“neutral.” Id. This approach is more in line with the Second Circuit’s approach in Bill Graham 
Archives than with the Fourth Circuit’s own approach in its earlier Sundeman case. 
162. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
163. Id. at 90. 
164. Id. at 99. The defendants also used the scanned images of the entire books to provide access 
to patrons with certified print disabilities; as to this use, the court concluded that the use was 
reasonable, but did not expressly state whether for that use the third factor favored fair use or was 
neutral. Id.  
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involved claims that the defendant had used the plaintiff’s entire 
copyrighted work. In sixteen of these cases, the court concluded that the 
defendant’s use was not fair,165 in fourteen cases the court found the use 
was fair,166 in two cases the court reached different conclusions as to 
different uses,167 and in two cases the court did not reach a conclusion as 
to the fairness of the defendant’s use.168 (These statistics are summarized 
in Table 7, below.) This Section looks at these cases more closely, both 
in terms of the types of works involved and in terms of whether and how 
appeals courts in those cases consider the relationship of the amount 
used to the defendant’s purpose. 
1. Quotation or Citation of Campbell 
Overall, opinions evaluating a defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s entire 
work do not appear to have used Campbell’s reasonableness analysis 
more often than opinions evaluating use of less than an entire work. Of 
the thirty-four cases in which a defendant used an entire work, eighteen 
(or about half) of the opinions quoted or cited Campbell, directly or 
165. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013); Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 
747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); 
Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 309 (3d Cir. 2011); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. 
Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2007); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2006); BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003); Elvis Presley Enters. v. 
Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2003) (use of photo in its entirety, though use of music 
and film and TV clips was often only part of the entire work); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. 
Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2002); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 
176 (2d Cir. 2001); Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2001); 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); Worldwide Church of 
God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. 
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 932 (2d Cir. 1994).  
166. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 105; 
Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 92 (2d Cir. 2014); Fox Broad. Co. 
v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 
737 F.3d 932, 949–50 (4th Cir. 2014); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1181 (9th Cir. 
2013); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009); Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 
(9th Cir. 2003); Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 397 (4th Cir. 2003); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News 
Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 
596, 608 (9th Cir. 2000); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 207 (4th Cir. 1998). 
167. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court and finding 
twenty-five uses fair; vacating and remanding as to five other uses); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. 
P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (films not fair use, lobby displays fair use). 
168. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, 
Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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indirectly, on reasonableness.169 Similarly, of the twenty-six cases in 
which a defendant did not use an entire work, about half of the opinions 
(fourteen) quoted or cited Campbell, directly or indirectly, on 
reasonableness.170 
As discussed above, courts appear more likely to quote or cite 
Campbell on the reasonableness approach in decisions that find a use to 
be fair than in decisions finding the use unfair.171 That appears to be true 
in the “entire work” cases as well. Of the sixteen cases finding at least 
one of the defendant’s uses of an entire work to be fair,172 thirteen 
directly or indirectly quote or cite Campbell on reasonableness.173 By 
contrast, in the sixteen cases finding the defendant’s uses of an entire 
work not to be fair,174 only five of the opinions quote or cite Campbell, 
directly or indirectly, on reasonableness (or at least state the principle, 
though without citation).175 
169. Of the cases cited in notes 165 through 168, supra, Campbell is quoted or cited, directly or 
indirectly, for reasonableness in eighteen cases. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., 756 F.3d at 89; 
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 96; Bouchat, 737 F.3d at 937; Seltzer, 725 F.3d 1170; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 
710; Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 308; iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 639; Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146; Wall 
Data Inc., 447 F.3d at 780; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613; Chi. Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 
629; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d at 630; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820; Bond, 317 F.3d at 396; Núñez, 
235 F.3d at 24; Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118; Sundeman, 142 F.3d at 206; Texaco, 
60 F.3d at 926. For an explanation of when an opinion is counted as citing Campbell on 
reasonableness, see note 94, supra.  
170. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1271 (11th Cir. 2014); SOFA Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Dodger Prods., 709 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 2013); Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration 
Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 63 (1st Cir. 2012); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy 
Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2012); Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010); Peter Letterese & Assoc., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 
1287, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006); NXIVM Corp. v. 
Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2004); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 
(9th Cir. 2003); L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 941 (9th Cir. 2002); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 144 (2d Cir. 1998); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
137 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1402 (9th Cir. 1997).  
171. See text accompanying notes 105–110. 
172. See notes 166 and 167, supra. 
173. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., 756 F.3d at 89; HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 96; Bouchat, 737 F.3d at  
937; Seltzer, 725 F.3d 1170; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710; Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 208; iParadigms, 562 
F.3d at 639; Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1167; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613; Kelly, 336 
F.3d at 820; Bond, 317 F.3d at 396; Núñez, 235 F.3d at 24; Sundeman, 142 F.3d at 206. 
174. See note 165, supra.  
175. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); Chi. Bd. of Educ. 
v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 
622 (9th Cir. 2003); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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2. Types of Work Used 
One important dimension on which these cases can be analyzed is the 
type of copyrighted work that the defendant has used. A wide variety of 
types of works are involved—including motion pictures, computer 
software, sculptural works, musical compositions, and sound recordings. 
But in over two-thirds (twenty-four176 out of thirty-four) of the “entire 
work” cases, the plaintiff’s work at issue is either a still image or a text. 
a. Still Images 
The largest share of the cases considering use of the entire work 
(fifteen of thirty-four) involved the use of still images. In ten cases, the 
works were photographs,177 including some shot as artworks, some shot 
for magazine reporting, some shot for publicity purposes, some personal 
snapshots, and some classified as adult entertainment. In five cases, the 
works were graphic images, including the design for a football team 
logo,178 posters and tickets for Grateful Dead concerts,179 the design of a 
quilt,180 and a poster showing a drawing of a screaming face.181 
Seven of the decisions found the defendant’s use of the entire image 
fair,182 five found the defendant’s use not fair,183 two found some of the 
defendant’s uses fair and others unfair (or not shown to be fair),184 and 
one did not decide the merits of the fair use claim.185 
The differences in results do not seem to depend significantly on 
176. See notes 177–181 and 212–217, infra.  
177. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014); Cariou, 714 F.3d 695, Perfect 
10, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, Kelly, 336 F.3d 811, Núñez, 235 F.3d 18, Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 
747 (6th Cir. 2012), Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012), Murphy v. 
Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011), Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 
244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001), Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d 622. 
178. Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932; Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301. 
179. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
180. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
181. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013). 
182. Bouchat, 737 F.3d at 949–50; Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759–60; Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1181; Perfect 
10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1170; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 615; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 822; Núñez, 
235 F.3d at 25. 
183. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 
688 F.3d 1164, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 309 
(3d Cir. 2011); Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001); Elvis Presley 
Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2003). 
184. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2013); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 
F.3d 301, 317 (4th Cir. 2010). 
185. Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70. 
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whether or how substantially the defendant altered the plaintiff’s image. 
In only four of the fifteen cases are the defendants’ uses described by the 
court as altering the plaintiffs’ image beyond minor cropping or changes 
in resolution.186 Some alterations were so substantial that the court found 
that little if any of the plaintiff’s copyrighted expression was 
recognizable in the defendant’s use.187 Some alterations were 
substantial,188 but the plaintiff’s work was “nonetheless clearly 
identifiable” in the defendant’s use.189 One alteration involved animating 
a still photograph as part of an audiovisual work.190 And in one case, 
some of the defendant’s uses of the plaintiff’s photographs involved 
substantial alterations while other challenged uses did not.191 
Three of the four cases in which the defendant substantially altered 
the plaintiff’s image found some or all of the defendant’s uses to be 
186. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759; Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1174; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710; Greenberg, 244 
F.3d 1267. Other cases involve uses of the plaintiff’s image in the defendant’s work that may be 
fleeting, out-of-focus, or partial, but as these do not appear to involve intentional alteration of the 
plaintiff’s image, I have not classified them as involving alteration. Bouchat, 737 F.3d 932; 
Bouchat, 619 F.3d 301; Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70.  
187. Kienitz, 766 F.3d 756. The court concluded that the defendant altered the plaintiff’s publicity 
portrait of the Madison, Wisconsin mayor’s face of so substantially that “[w]hat is left [of the 
plaintiff’s photo in the image on the defendant’s t-shirt], besides a hint of [the mayor’s] smile, is the 
outline of his face, which can’t be copyrighted.” Id. at 759. Given this analysis, it is not clear 
whether the defendant’s use was even infringing; if not, no claim of fair use would be necessary. 
188. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1174. The defendant’s video footage featured a version of the plaintiff’s 
poster Scream Icon. Staub, who created the accused video, “cut out the image of Scream Icon [from 
a photograph of it on street corner] and modified it by adding a large red “spray-painted” cross over 
the middle of the screaming face. He also changed the contrast and color and added black streaks 
running down the right side of the face. Staub’s image further differs from Scream Icon because 
Staub’s original photograph was of a weathered, slightly defaced, and torn poster.” Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269. Plaintiff photographer Greenberg had taken a photo of a diver 
that appeared on the cover of National Geographic magazine in 1962, and that later appeared in the 
introductory sequence for The Complete National Geographic (“CNG”), a thirty CD-ROM set 
containing a digital image of every issue of the magazine from 1888 to 1996.  
The [defendant’s moving covers] Sequence is an animated clip that plays automatically when 
any disc from the CNG library is activated. The clip begins with the image of an actual cover 
of a past issue of the [National Geographic] Magazine. This image, through the use of 
computer animation, overlappingly fades (“morphs”) into the image of another cover, pauses 
on that cover for approximately one second, and then morphs into another cover image, and so 
on, until 10 different covers have been displayed. One of the cover images used in the moving 
covers sequence is a picture of a diver that was taken by Greenberg in 1961. The entire 
sequence lasts for 25 seconds, and is accompanied by music and sound effects.  
Id.  
191. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710 (“Many of Prince’s works use Cariou’s photographs . . . in whole or 
substantial part. In some works . . . Prince did not alter the source photograph very much at all. In 
others . . . the entire source photograph is used but is also heavily obscured and altered to the point 
that Cariou’s original is barely recognizable.”). 
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fair.192 Of the remaining ten cases in which the court reached the merits 
of the fair use claim involving the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
entire image without alteration, five found the use fair,193 four found the 
use not fair,194 and one found some uses fair and some uses unfair.195 
Given the variety in the level of alterations made by defendants whose 
uses were found to be fair, and the fact that in most of the cases where a 
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s entire image was found to be fair the 
defendant did not alter the image, the degree of the defendant’s 
alteration of the plaintiff’s photograph does not seem to be driving the 
decision as to whether the use is fair. 
In any event, Campbell’s reasonableness inquiry does not seem to 
have played a significant role in deciding how to evaluate the third factor 
when the defendant used an altered version of the plaintiff’s entire 
image. None of the four cases involving substantial alterations by the 
defendant196 expressly discusses whether the amount that the defendant 
used was reasonable in light of the purpose. One of those cases states 
that the defendant’s use of the entire work was “necessary” to achieve 
the defendant’s purpose without offering any explanation or analysis of 
why that was so.197 A second case rejected the district court’s view that 
the portion the defendant took “was substantially greater than 
necessary,” but did so not based on any express inquiry into whether the 
amount taken was reasonable.198 
Campbell’s reasonableness approach does seem to have played a 
significant role, however, in decisions finding that the use of an entire 
image without alteration was fair. Courts in many of those cases 
192. Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759; Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1174; Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. The use of the 
plaintiff’s photo was found not to be fair in Greenberg. 244 F.3d 1267. 
193. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 949–50 (4th Cir. 2014); Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 
(9th Cir. 2003); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000). 
194. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 
688 F.3d 1164, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 309 
(3d Cir. 2011); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2003). 
195. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 317 (4th Cir. 2010). 
196. See note 186, supra.  
197. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1178–79. 
198. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 695, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 
2d 337, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Instead, the court explained that the defendant was allowed “to 
‘conjure up’ at least enough of the original to fulfill its transformative purpose” and that the 
defendant’s use was in fact transformative. Id. (emphasis in original). The court may have 
concluded that the amount taken was reasonable to fulfill the transformative purpose, but at best it 
did so implicitly. 
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expressly related the third-factor inquiry to the defendant’s purpose as 
Campbell directs. For example, in the Bill Graham Archives case, the 
defendant reproduced several of the plaintiff’s copyrighted Grateful 
Dead concert posters in its 480-page illustrated history of the band.199 In 
evaluating the first factor, the court concluded that the defendant’s use of 
the images to illustrate its historical volume was use for a transformative 
purpose.200 When the court turned to the third factor, it “conclude[d] that 
such use by [the defendant] is tailored to further its transformative 
purpose because [the defendant’s] reduced size reproductions of 
[plaintiff’s] images in their entirety displayed the minimal image size 
and quality necessary to ensure the reader’s recognition of the images as 
historical artifacts of Grateful Dead concert events.”201 Other courts 
found the amount of the defendant’s use reasonable, and found the use to 
be fair, when the defendant was using the entire image for what the court 
viewed as transformative purposes, such as indexing images on the 
internet202 and news reporting.203 
The two decisions in Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Limited 
Partnership204 offer an instructive contrast that shows the relationship of 
the reasonableness analysis to the defendant’s purpose. Both cases 
involved claims that the defendant football team infringed the copyright 
in the plaintiff’s team logo by using the logo in highlight films and in 
historical exhibits at the defendant’s stadium. The court found the use of 
the logo in historical exhibits to be fair use in both cases, but with 
respect to the highlight films, the earlier decision found that the 
defendant’s use was not fair, while the later decision found the use fair. 
In all three instances when the court found the use of the entire logo to 
be fair, the court found that the third factor was “neutral,”205 of “very 
little weight,”206 “of no help to plaintiff,”207 and in each instance that 
conclusion was based on the fact that the defendant needed to use the 
199. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 2006). The 
defendant also used an image of a Grateful Dead concert ticket. Id.  
200. Id. at 609–11. 
201   Id. at 613 (emphasis added). 
202. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).  
203. Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
204. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932 (4th Cir. 2014); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens 
Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010). 
205. Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 315.  
206. Bouchat, 737 F.3d at 943. 
207. Id. at 949. 
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entire logo to “fulfill” a “legitimate transformative purpose.”208 In the 
one instance in which the court did not find the defendant’s use fair, it 
weighted the third factor against fair use, and did so because it viewed 
the defendant’s use as not for a transformative purpose.209 Indeed, in 
most of the cases where the defendant’s use of an entire still image was 
found not to be fair, the court weighted the first fair use factor—the 
purpose of the use—against the defendant,210 and in evaluating the third 
factor usually viewed the defendant as having used more than was 
reasonable in light of the defendant’s purpose.211 
Campbell’s reasonableness approach thus seems to be important in 
the fair use determination in many of the cases involving the defendant’s 
use of the plaintiff’s entire still image. 
b. Literary Works 
The second largest share of the cases considering use of the entire 
work (nine out of thirty-four) involved the use of texts. Two-thirds of 
these cases involved relatively long literary works. Three involved 
published books (and one of those three, HathiTrust, involves millions 
of published books),212 two involved unpublished book-length 
manuscripts,213 and one involved a doctoral dissertation.214 Shorter but 
still substantial literary works, including scientific journal articles215 and 
multiple-choice school examinations, featured in two other cases.216 
Only one case appears to involve relatively short literary works: papers 
208. Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 315; Bouchat, 737 F.3d at 943, 949. 
209. Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 311–12. 
210. Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 758–59 (6th Cir. 2012); Monge v. Maya Magazines, 
Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1173–77 (9th Cir. 2012); Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 
295, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2011); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 628–29 (9th Cir. 
2003); Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing 
the use as “transformative” but indicating that the transformation “transcends a use that is fair 
within the context of § 107”). 
211. Monge, 688 F.3d at 1179; Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d at 630. In at least one instance, the 
court weighted factor three against fair use without any analysis of the reasonableness of the amount 
the defendant used in light of the purpose. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 309. 
212. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, 
Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. 
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (380 pages). 
213. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003); Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
214. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2013). 
215. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
216. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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written by students to satisfy school assignments.217 
Four of the decisions found the defendant’s use of the entire text to be 
fair,218 and five found the defendant’s use not fair.219 Interestingly, three 
of the four uses found fair involved use of entire books or entire 
unpublished book manuscripts, and only one involved use of relatively 
short works (students’ school papers). A common feature of the four 
uses found fair, however, is that in each case, the defendant’s use did not 
expose the plaintiff’s work to the general public. In HathiTrust, the 
defendant’s use in a search engine of the full text of published books it 
had scanned allowed the public only to identify on which pages of which 
books a search term appears.220 Bond v. Blum221 involved the submission 
of a copy of the plaintiff’s manuscript memoir (Self-Portrait of a 
Patricide: How I Got Away with Murder) into evidence in a court 
proceeding over child custody, where the manuscript would apparently 
only be available in the court file.222 And in Sundeman an archive that 
possessed the fragile manuscript of a deceased author’s unpublished first 
novel copied the manuscript for a scholar who was preparing a scholarly 
review of the novel, which was presented at a conference and not further 
disseminated.223 Even the shorter works at issue in A.V. v. iParadigms, 
LLC,224 the student papers, were stored by the defendant only so that 
papers submitted to the defendant’s plagiarism detection service in the 
future could be compared against prior submissions; only if plagiarism 
were suspected would the plaintiffs’ works be disseminated outside the 
defendant’s company, and then only to the teacher to whom the 
potentially plagiarized paper was submitted.225 
By contrast, in four of the five cases in which the defendant’s use of 
an entire literary work was not found to be fair use, the defendant’s use 
made the plaintiff’s work more widely available. In two cases, both 
217. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
218. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014); iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630; 
Bond, 317 F.3d 385; Sundeman, 142 F.3d 194. 
219. Diversey, 738 F.3d 1196; Chi. Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d 624; Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. 
v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. 
Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 
F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
220. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 91. Access to the full text of the plaintiff’s books was limited to the 
defendant libraries’ patrons with certified print disabilities. Id.  
221. 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003). 
222. Id. at 390. 
223. Sundeman, 142 F.3d at 199. 
224. 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
225. Id. at 641. 
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involving religious texts, the defendant was selling copies of the 
defendant’s entire book,226 while in one other case the defendant 
published the plaintiff’s multiple-choice exams in the defendant’s 
newspaper.227 And in a fourth case, the defendant made the plaintiff’s 
unpublished doctoral dissertation available to the general public in its 
university library.228 Of the cases finding against fair use, only in the 
Texaco case, involving the defendant oil company’s copying of articles 
in scientific journals for the internal use of its own research scientists, 
did the defendant’s use not make the plaintiff’s work more publicly 
available.229 
The courts finding fair use of an entire literary text generally used 
Campbell’s reasonableness inquiry in their analysis of factor three. In 
HathiTrust and Sundeman, as discussed above, the court expressly 
concluded that the defendant’s use of the entire work was reasonable in 
light of the purpose for the defendant’s use. The HathiTrust defendants 
needed to scan and index the books in their libraries in their entirety in 
order to make full-text searching available.230 In Sundeman the archive 
needed to make a complete copy of the fragile manuscript in order for 
the reviewer to create a critical review of the novel.231 In iParadigms, 
the circuit court didn’t itself address the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s use of entire student papers, but it expressly approved of the 
analysis in the district court, which had concluded that the defendant 
“must” use the plaintiff’s entire works in order to achieve its purpose of 
detecting suspected plagiarism.232 Only the Bond opinion does not 
address the reasonableness of the defendants’ use to achieve their 
purpose, but the court’s factor three analysis in that case did look to the 
defendants’ purpose, explaining that the “sole purpose and intent of 
introducing Bond’s manuscript [into evidence in the child custody case] 
226. Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002), 
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). In Merkos, 
the defendant’s version of the prayerbook, which apparently included additional material beyond the 
translation copied from the plaintiff, was apparently sold in competition with the plaintiffs, while in 
Worldwide Church of God the defendant was distributing copies of a religious text that the plaintiff 
had removed from circulation. 
227. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2003). 
228. Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013). It is unclear from the opinion 
whether the dissertation was available only to be read at the library, or whether it could be 
borrowed. 
229. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). 
230. See text accompanying notes 269–274, infra.  
231. Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205–06 (4th Cir. 1998). 
232. See text accompanying notes 279–280, infra. 
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was to obtain admissions of fact against [Bond’s] interest in an effort to 
prove that his home would not be a suitable place for the custody of 
children,” and concluding that use of the plaintiff’s work for that 
purpose would not “undermine the protections of the [Copyright] 
Act.”233 
Overall, then, the Campbell approach has played a significant role in 
cases concluding that the use of an entire literary work is fair. The factor 
three analysis in these cases appears to focus less on simply how much 
of the plaintiff’s work the defendant has copied, and more on how, and 
how publicly, the defendant is using the work. The less the purpose of 
the defendant’s use requires disseminating the plaintiff’s work publicly, 
the more likely it seems that the defendant’s use of the entire work may 
be found reasonable in light of the defendant’s purpose. 
c. Other Types of Works 
The remaining ten “entire work” cases involve a scattering of 
different types of works. One involved broadcast television 
programming, and the use at issue was treated as essentially the same as 
the time-shifting approved in Sony.234 Three involved computer 
software. One of these found a defendant who made intermediate copies 
of computer software in the course of reverse engineering it in order to 
write a noninfringing compatible computer program had engaged in fair 
use.235 In the other two software cases, fair use was not found where a 
defendant installed multiple copies of software beyond those it had 
licensed from the copyright owner236 and where a defendant made copies 
of software while providing computer maintenance and repair services to 
those who had licensed the software.237 Two involved “sculptural” 
works—stuffed Beanie Babies in one case,238 and “sculptured metallic 
ornamental wearable art” described by the court as “eye jewelry” in the 
other239—and both cases considered the defendants’ uses to be 
photographs of the “entire” works (though it seems unclear whether a 
single photograph could capture the entirety of a three-dimensional 
sculptural work). Three cases involved music: two cases challenging 
233. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). 
234. Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014). 
235. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2000). 
236. Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 778–82 (9th Cir. 2006). 
237. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1995). 
238. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
239. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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peer-to-peer file exchange were brought in one instance by owners of 
copyrights in both sound recordings and musical works240 and in the 
other by sound recording copyright owners alone,241 and one case 
challenged the defendant karaoke recording supplier’s use of the 
plaintiff’s copyrighted musical works.242 In all three cases, the court 
found the challenged uses were not fair. And one case involved a sound 
recording, not of music but of a company’s conference call with 
investors regarding its quarterly earnings report, and the use of that 
entire recording by a subscription financial news service was found to be 
fair.243 
Table 7 summarizes the outcomes of cases where the defendant used 
the plaintiff’s entire work, broken down by the main categories of works 
used. The figure in parentheses in each cell indicates the number of 
opinions in which the court cited or quoted, directly or indirectly, the 











Still Images 7 (6) 2 (2) 5 (1) 1 15 
Texts 4 (4)  5 (3)  9 
Other 3 (1)  6 (1) 1 10 
Totals 14 (11) 2 (2) 16 (5) 2 34 (18) 
 
3. Reasonableness and Use of Entire Visual Work 
Several opinions reviewing fair use claims by a defendant who used 
an entire visual work identify the copyrighted visual work as essentially 
indivisible, and expressly take this indivisibility into account in the 
factor three analysis analyzing whether the defendant used a reasonable 
amount. 
The Ninth Circuit offered perhaps the most express statement of this 
position in Seltzer v. Green Day, in which the video backdrop for the 
defendant band’s concerts featured a nearly complete (though somewhat 
altered) copy of the plaintiff’s work Scream Icon, a drawing of a 
240. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
241. BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). 
242. Zomba Enters., Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). 
243. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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screaming, contorted face:244 
[U]nlike an episode of [a television show] or a book manuscript, 
[the plaintiff’s drawing] Scream Icon is not meaningfully 
divisible. Given that fact, . . . this factor will not weigh against 
an alleged infringer, even when he copies the whole work, if he 
takes no more than is necessary for his intended use.245 
Other appellate courts have at least suggested a similar approach for still 
photographs.246 And the Ninth Circuit offered an extended discussion of 
this issue in the context of sculptural works in Mattel Inc. v. Walking 
Mountain Productions.247 The plaintiff’s copyrighted sculptural work in 
that case was the familiar Barbie doll, and the defendant was accused of 
infringing the copyright by producing a series of photographs called 
“Food Chain Barbie” that “depicted Barbie in various absurd and often 
sexualized positions,” including “in danger of being attacked by vintage 
household appliances.”248 
Mattel’s argument that [the defendant] could have taken a lesser 
portion of its work attempts to benefit from the somewhat 
unique nature of the copyrighted work in this case. Copyright 
infringement actions generally involve songs, video, or written 
works. Because parts of these works are naturally severable, the 
[defendant’s] new work can easily choose portions of the 
244. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013) 
245. Id. at 1178. 
246. In Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 760 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012), the court noted that “[o]ther 
courts have suggested that [the third] factor may be of lesser import where the publication of a 
photograph is involved, because a photograph’s value usually lies only in its full reproduction.” The 
Sixth Circuit stated that “[e]ven if we were to agree with this point,” it “merely diminishes the 
extent to which this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor.” Id.  
247. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mt. Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). I have not categorized 
Mattel as an entire work case, because the Ninth Circuit rejected Mattel’s argument that the 
defendant’s photographs used the entire work: “A verbatim copy of Barbie would be an exact three 
dimensional reproduction of the doll. Forsythe did not display the entire Barbie head and body in his 
photographs. Parts of the Barbie figure are obscured or omitted depending on the angle at which the 
photos were taken and whether other objects obstructed a view of the Barbie figure.” Id. at 803–04. 
This approach seems more nuanced than Judge Posner’s view in Ty, Inc. v. Publications 
International Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). That case also involved photographs of sculptural 
works—Beanie Babies stuffed animals. The court stated that “[f]actor (3) is inapplicable to Beanie 
Babies, each one of which is copyrighted separately, so that there can be no partial copying as a 
matter of fact (no one, we imagine, wants a photograph of part of a Beanie Baby).” Id. at 522. 
Indeed, the one allegedly infringing photograph reproduced in the court’s opinion, id. at 525, 
depicts a number of Beanie Baby toys, and, to paraphrase the Mattel opinion, parts of some of the 
stuffed animals are obscured or omitted because of the angle at which the photo was taken and 
because objects obstruct the view of some the stuffed animals. Because the Ty court treats the 
defendant as having used the entire work, I have counted the case as an entire work case. 
248. Mattel Inc., 353 F.3d at 796. 
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original work and add to it. Here because the copyrighted 
material is a doll design and the infringing work is a photograph 
containing that doll, [the defendant], short of severing the doll, 
must add to it by creating a context around it and capturing that 
context in a photograph.249 
The court concluded that the defendant had indeed incorporated Barbie 
into new works “imbued with a different character.”250 
While the indivisible nature of a visual work may well be relevant in 
analyzing the third fair use factor, the outcomes of the cases show that 
such indivisibility does not necessarily mean that the defendant’s use is 
fair. Seventeen of the thirty-four entire work cases involve use of the 
entirety of a visual work.251 Seven of the decisions found the defendant’s 
use of the entire work fair,252 six found the defendant’s use not fair,253 
two found some of the defendant’s uses fair and others unfair (or not 
shown to be fair),254 and two did not decide the merits of the fair use 
claim.255 Thus, even if the defendant’s use of a plaintiff’s entire work 
has a stronger claim to reasonableness in relation to purpose because the 
work is an indivisible visual work, such a use will not necessarily be 
found to be fair. 
C. Factor Three and New Technological Uses of Entire Works 
Campbell’s approach appears to be particularly important in cases 
where a defendant is using others’ copyrighted works in ways enabled 
by new technologies, because in many of the cases challenging these 
uses, the defendant is using the entire copyrighted work. 
In several cases, the defendants arguably used new technology in a 
manner similar to earlier uses of older technology, and the technological 
aspects of the defendant’s use do not seem to make much difference to 
the outcome of the case.256 For example, a defendant’s posting a text or 
249. Id. at 804.  
250. Id. The court concluded that the defendant’s use was fair. 
251. See notes 177, 178–181, and 238–239 supra.  
252. See note 182, supra. 
253. See notes 183 and 239, supra.  
254. See note 184, supra. 
255. See notes 185 and 238, supra.  
256. Unlike the cases discussed in the remainder of this section, in some of the cases identified in 
this paragraph the defendant used the plaintiff’s entire work—i.e., Murphy v. Millennium Radio 
Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011); Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 
(9th Cir. 2014)—and in others the defendant used only portions of the plaintiff’s work—i.e., 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014); Soc’y of the Holy 
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an image on her website does not seem particularly different from 
publishing that same text in printed form.257 Similarly, showing 
previews of movies available for rental at a movie rental store does not 
seem particularly different when those previews are shown on the rental 
store’s website rather than on monitors in the physical store itself.258 
Recording broadcast television programs for time-shifting purposes on a 
digital video recorder seems highly analogous to doing so on an analog 
videocassette recorder.259 And making copies of academic publications 
available on electronic reserves does not seem that different from putting 
physical copies on reserve in a university library, at least with respect to 
evaluating the amount and substantiality of the portion used by the 
defendant.260 
Seven cases in the study, though, involve uses of new technologies 
that differ substantially from those that came before. Many of those 
cases raise novel questions of how to evaluate factor three not just 
because of the new technology, but because the defendants in those 
cases used the entirety of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works. These cases 
involved a variety of different uses of different kinds of works: 
• In HathiTrust,261 the defendants scanned the entire contents of the 
books held in several academic libraries and created an online 
repository. Users could search the full-text of the scanned 
volumes and determine the pages on which the search terms 
appear, though the search results did not include any of the text 
from the book. Certified print-disabled users could obtain access 
to the full text (or in some cases the scanned images) of books. 
Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. 
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). I have also not treated as “new” 
technology cases during the 1994 to 2014 period karaoke devices (involved in Zomba Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Panorama Records, Inc., 491 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)) or reverse engineering of 
computer software (involved in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 
596, 609 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
257. See, e.g., Gregory, 689 F.3d 29 (defendant posted plaintiff’s translation of religious text 
online); Murphy, 650 F.3d 295 (defendant posted plaintiff’s photograph of radio disc jockeys on 
radio station’s website). The outcomes in these cases do not seem substantially different from those 
in cases of similar use in old technologies. See, e.g., Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 
2012) (defendant printed plaintiff’s photograph of TV news reporter); Merkos L’Inyonei Chinuch, 
Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2002) (defendant printed copies of 
plaintiff’s translation of religious text). 
258. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191. 
259. Fox Broad. Co., 747 F.3d at 1070. 
260. Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d 1232. Handling reserves electronically might have 
differences from physical reserves that would be relevant to other fair use factors. 
261. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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• In Swatch Group Management Services Ltd. v. Bloomberg 
L.P.,262 the defendant financial news service posted online for its 
subscribers a complete sound recording (and written transcript) of 
a 132-minute conference call between Swatch executives and 
investment analysts in which the executives discussed Swatch’s 
annual earnings report.263 
• In iParadigms,264 the defendant plagiarism detection company 
reviewed electronic copies of written assignments by students to 
assess whether the assignment had been plagiarized. In many 
instances the defendant retained an electronic copy of the entire 
student paper it reviewed in order to compare those papers 
against future submissions to its plagiarism-checking service. 
• In both Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.265 and Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp.,266 the defendant search engines made 
thumbnail copies of images posted on publicly available 
websites, and displayed those thumbnail copies in the search 
results shown to users of their image search engines when the 
images were relevant to a user’s search terms. 
• In both BMG Music v. Gonzalez267 and A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc.,268 the defendant (or, in Napster’s case, the users of 
the defendant’s system) used peer-to-peer software to download 
entire phonorecords of copyrighted musical recordings, and made 
those phonorecords available to other users of the software to 
download in their entirety. 
All of these uses were challenged by copyright owners, and in all but 
two of the cases (the peer-to-peer cases), the reviewing courts concluded 
that the defendant’s use was fair, even though the defendant was copying 
the entirety of the plaintiff’s work. In all five cases in which the 
defendant prevailed, the appeals court concluded that the third factor did 
not weigh against fair use because the amount copied was reasonable in 
light of the use to which the defendant put the copy. 
262. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2014). 
263. Neither telephone conference calls nor recordings of them involve new technologies, but it 
seems highly unlikely that a financial news service would have used the entirety of a two-hour-plus 
conference call in a radio or television report. Instead, the use of the entire recording seems 
facilitated entirely by availability of internet technology for dissemination of information by the 
financial news service. 
264. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
265. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
266. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).  
267. BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005). 
268. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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In the HathiTrust case, the Second Circuit expressly evaluated the 
third fair use factor along the lines discussed in Campbell. Although the 
defendants maintained complete digital copies of the works in their 
libraries, the court determined that “[b]ecause it was reasonably 
necessary for the [HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL)] to make use of the 
entirety of the works in order to enable the full-text search function, we 
do not believe the copying was excessive.”269 Indexing only parts of the 
books in the library collections would obviously frustrate the goal of 
allowing patrons to search the full text of those books. The copyright 
owners challenging HathiTrust’s use also argued that the amount of the 
defendants’ use should weigh against fair use because the defendants 
stored not only the full text of the copyrighted volumes, but also the 
images of each page scanned from the physical book.270 Again, the court 
looked to the purpose for maintaining copies of the image files. Doing so 
allowed HathiTrust to provide greater access to the books for those with 
print disabilities. Many books contain nontextual visual information 
(charts, illustrations, etc.) that many people with visual impairments 
could see using the image scans with substantial magnification or 
manipulation of contrast, and individuals who could see the images but 
could not hold physical books or turn their pages could use assistive 
devices to access the scanned images of the books.271 This convinced the 
court that maintaining the image files was reasonable in light of the 
defendant’s purpose—providing access to individuals with print 
disabilities: “For those individuals, gaining access to the HDL’s image 
files—in addition to the text-only files—is necessary to perceive the 
books fully. Consequently, it is reasonable for the Libraries to retain 
both the text and image copies.”272 The court expressly concluded that 
factor three favored a finding of fair use for the defendant’s full-text 
search use;273 the court did not expressly state its conclusion as to factor 
three for the print-disabled services, but its analysis indicates that it did 
not view that factor as weighing against fair use.274 
269. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014). 
270. Id. at 102. 
271. Id. at 102–03. 
272. Id. at 103. The court also concluded, with respect to both the full-text and image copies of 
plaintiffs’ works, that the fact that the defendants’ maintained four copies of the repository’s 
contents (one at each of two online mirror sites available for use, and two in the form of encrypted 
backup tapes not connected to the Internet) did not tilt factor three against fair use. “We have no 
reason to think that these copies are excessive or unreasonable in relation to the purposes identified 
by the Libraries and permitted by the law of copyright.” Id. at 99; see also id. at 103 n.6. 
273. Id. at 99. 
274. Id. 102–03. 
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Similarly, in Swatch Group the Second Circuit evaluated the third 
factor using Campbell’s reasonableness approach. In the court’s view, 
“[t]he recording [of the earnings conference call] has independent 
informational value over and above the value of a written transcript or 
article.”275 In particular, the court observed that “by disseminating a full, 
unadulterated recording of the earnings call, Bloomberg was able to 
convey valuable factual information that would have been impaired if 
Bloomberg had undertaken to alter the speech of the Swatch Group 
executives by interjecting its own interpretations.”276 Using the actual 
recording, rather than a transcript or an article, allowed the defendant “to 
convey with precision not only the raw data of the Swatch Group 
executives’ words, but also more subtle indications of meaning inferable 
from their hesitation, emphasis, tone of voice, and other such aspects of 
their delivery.”277 Consequently, the court found that the defendant’s 
“use of the entire recording was reasonable in light of its purpose of 
disseminating important financial information.”278 
The court in iParadigms also did not view the defendant’s copying of 
the plaintiff students’ entire written assignments as an impediment to 
finding fair use.279 Although the appeals court did not really discuss the 
relationship of the defendants’ copying to the purpose for its use, it 
expressly affirmed the district court’s analysis, which had considered 
that relationship and had observed that “[i]n order to be successful in its 
plagiarism detection services, [iParadigms] must [use the entirety of the 
plaintiffs’ works].”280 And the district court noted that the copies that 
iParadigms made were used only for comparison purposes in checking 
future submissions for plagiarism, and could only be viewed (by a 
teacher) if a future submission indicated the possibility of plagiarism. 
Thus, the appellate court concluded, while the defendant used the 
plaintiffs’ works in their entirety, that was necessary to achieve the 
purpose of plagiarism detection and the use was “limited in purpose and 
scope.”281 If the defendant had copied only portions of student papers 
275. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 90 (2d Cir. 2014). 
276. Id. at 85. The court made this observation in its discussion of the first factor, but in 
discussing factor three the court expressly stated that its conclusion that the defendant’s taking was 
reasonable was based on “the reasons already explained in our discussion of the first fair use 
factor.” Id. at 90. 
277. Id. at 84. 
278. Id. at 90. 
279. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 642 (4th Cir. 2009). 
280. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473, 483 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
281. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 642. While the circuit court did not itself discuss the relationship 
between the defendant’s copying and its purpose, it did reject the plaintiff’s argument on appeal that 
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into its database, that of course would not prove especially useful in 
detecting whether future student papers had copied from any of the 
papers already in the database. 
The image search engine cases also found that the defendants’ 
copying of the plaintiffs’ entire works did not militate against finding 
fair use. They did so by following Campbell’s admonition to consider 
whether the amount of copying was reasonable given the purpose of the 
copying (operating an image search engine), which the court had already 
found was a purpose that favored fair use.282 In Kelly, the court 
explained why the defendant Arriba’s copying of the entirety of the 
plaintiff’s images did not weigh against fair use: 
[A]lthough Arriba did copy each of Kelly’s images as a whole, it 
was reasonable to do so in light of Arriba’s use of the images. It 
was necessary for Arriba to copy the entire image to allow users 
to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more 
information about the image or the originating web site. If 
Arriba only copied part of the image, it would be more difficult 
to identify it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual 
search engine.283 
The court ruled that factor three favored neither party, and concluded 
that the defendant’s use was fair.284 Four years later, the same court 
concluded that “the same analysis [of the third factor] applies to 
Google’s use of Perfect 10’s image” in Google’s visual search engine, 
and again found that copying entire images for use in a search engine 
was fair use.285 
By contrast to all of these cases, in the two decisions concerning peer-
to-peer dissemination of recorded music, the courts concluded that the 
exchange of complete copies of recorded songs over peer-to-peer 
networks was not fair use. Neither court offered much express 
discussion of the third factor in its fair use analysis, and neither 
expressly considered the amount used in light of the purpose.286 Judge 
the district court had improperly considered the transformative nature of the defendant’s use in 
evaluating the third factor: “Plaintiff’s argument . . . fails to recognize the overlap that exists 
between the fair use factors. The first and third factors, for example, take into account to some 
degree the purpose of the disputed use.” Id. 
282. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir. 2003). 
283. Id. at 821. 
284. Id.  
285. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). 
286. In Gonzalez, the court’s identification of the defendant’s purpose in discussing the first 
factor was limited to the statement that the defendant “was not engaged in a nonprofit use.” BMG 
Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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Easterbrook in Gonzalez simply observed that the defendant 
“downloaded (and kept) whole copyrighted songs (for which, as with 
poetry, copying of more than a couplet or two is deemed excessive).”287 
After the court measured the amount used by the defendant—the whole 
work—it made no inquiry into the reasonableness of the use of that 
amount in light of the defendant’s purpose. The court in Napster also did 
not expressly evaluate the amount of the peer-to-peer user’s copying in 
light of her purpose (either in considering the general fair use analysis or 
in analyzing the specifically identified uses of sampling and space-
shifting). The court merely observed that Napster users engaged in 
wholesale copying of the plaintiff’s works, which usually, but not 
always, weighs against fair use.288 
This is not to suggest that either of the peer-to-peer cases would have 
been decided differently if the courts, in considering factor three, had 
asked whether the defendant used a reasonable amount in light of her 
purpose. Both courts found in evaluating factor one that the peer-to-peer 
copier’s purpose did not favor fair use.289 As a result, even if the court 
had concluded that the user did not copy more than “necessary” to 
achieve her purpose, it seems likely that factor three could still have 
weighed against fair use because her purpose was disfavored.290 And 
because copying the plaintiff’s entire work, as the user did in these 
cases, ordinarily militates against a finding of fair use, such copying 
would likely have that ordinary effect where the purpose for the copying 
was one that weighed against fair use. 
All of these cases suggest that, in recent years at least, new digital 
technologies have often enabled new uses of copyrighted works that 
allow or require using the entire work. Machine-processed full-text 
searching or comparison of the kind at issue in HathiTrust and 
iParadigms is simply not possible, at least on any sizable scale, except 
for the fact that the texts are in digital form in their entirety. The 
existence of a search engine to locate images posted online obviously 
requires the existence a network like the Internet and the computer 
287. Id. at 890. Of course, it is not at all clear that copying “more than a couplet or two” of a 
copyrighted song is necessarily deemed excessive; Campbell itself arguably found that a 
defendant’s copying of “more than a couplet or two” of the plaintiff’s copyrighted song lyrics in 
that case not only was not excessive but was reasonable. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 587–89 (1994). 
288. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001). 
289. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d at 890 (stating as first factor analysis that defendant “was not engaged in 
a nonprofit use”); Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1015 (upholding district court’s conclusion that peer-to-
peer user’s use was not transformative and was commercial). 
290. See Part III.C, supra. 
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power and algorithms that enable indexing and searching, and the 
effectiveness of that search engine clearly depends on using the entire 
image in the results that the search engine returns. If courts were guided 
only by Sony’s principle that copying an entire work ordinarily, but not 
always, militates against fair use, it might be more difficult in these 
cases to decide whether the third factor counsels for or against fair use 
when such uses are challenged. The Campbell approach can explain 
when a court should not weigh wholesale copying against fair use—
when use of the entire work is reasonable to achieve the purpose for the 
use. 
The possibility for courts to weigh the third statutory factor in favor 
of (or at least not against) fair use when a defendant copies an entire 
work may well have continuing importance in resolving infringement 
claims involving new technologies, given that digital technologies seem 
likely to continue to allow (or require) making entire copies of works in 
order to access the work.291 For example, space-shifting uses, which 
appear to be becoming more and more common, involve making 
complete copies.292 This happens when a user rips an MP3 file from a 
music track on a compact disc, or copies a legally downloaded MP3 file 
from the hard drive of the computer to which it was downloaded, in 
order to be able to listen to the song on a portable digital music player 
such as an iPod or a tablet or mobile phone.293 It also happens when a 
user uploads an MP3 file to a cloud storage service in order to access the 
song from any Internet-connected device.294 Similarly, a user who backs 
up computer files that legitimately reside on her hard drive makes 
complete copies of all of the copyrighted works contained in those 
backed up files, whether she backs up to an external hard drive or to a 
cloud backup service.295 
291. For a discussion of whether Congress intended personal uses of entire copies of copyrighted 
works to be within the scope of copyright owners’ exclusive rights, see generally Jessica Litman, 
Campbell at 21/Sony at 31, 90 WASH. L. REV. 651 (2015), elsewhere in this symposium. 
292. Of course, the time-shifting uses considered in Sony involved making complete copies as 
well, and those copies were found to be noninfringing by application of the fair use doctrine.  
293. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 
(9th Cir. 1999); see also R. Anthony Reese, The Temporal Dynamics of “Capable of Substantial 
Noninfringing Uses,” 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 207 (2006) (discussing claims 
by copyright owners in litigation and rulemaking proceedings that consumer copying of music for 
personal use is lawful only because authorized by copyright owners). 
294. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2510–11 (2014) 
(leaving undecided the question of whether a cloud storage service engages in public performance 
when it transmits to a customer a performance using a file stored on the service by that customer).  
295. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 150 (2001), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104 ‐report‐ vol‐ 1.pdf. 
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Few cases involving these issues have been litigated to decision on 
fair use grounds. At least one court has strongly implied that space-
shifting recorded music that one owns constitutes fair use,296 and 
academics have considered these issues and their implications.297 But if 
and when courts are squarely presented with the issue of whether such 
uses are fair, the Campbell Court’s approach to the third factor should 
help the courts to think carefully, and less abstractly, about the issue of 
whether an accused infringer claiming fair use has or has not copied “too 
much” of the plaintiff’s work. 
CONCLUSION 
The Campbell opinion has garnered substantial attention for 
articulating the importance of transformativeness in fair use analysis. 
Campbell’s guidance on how to evaluate the third fair use factor has 
gotten less notice, but is an important part of the decision’s legacy. The 
Court explained that the statutory question of whether the defendant has 
taken “too much” of the plaintiff’s work should be answered not in the 
abstract but by judging whether the defendant used an amount that was 
reasonable in relation to the purpose of her use. 
About half of the appellate fair use decisions since Campbell have 
expressly looked to Campbell’s reasonableness approach in analyzing 
the third factor. Express consideration of whether the amount the 
defendant used was reasonable is correlated with the court weighting 
factor three as favoring fair use (or at least as neutral), and with the court 
finding the defendant’s use fair, though this correlation does not permit 
any conclusions as to causation. 
Campbell’s approach has perhaps been most significant when the 
defendant has used the plaintiff’s entire work. While the Sony decision 
made clear that using the entire work did not necessarily doom a fair use 
claim, it offered no real guidance as to when the use of the entire work 
should not have its ordinary effect of militating against fair use. 
Campbell indicates that using the entire work might not weigh against 
fair use if it is reasonable for the defendant to use the entire work in light 
of the purpose for her use. The importance of the reasonableness 
296. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 180 F.3d 1072. 
297. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007); Rebecca 
Giblin & Jane Ginsburg, We Still Need to Talk About Aereo, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 109 (2015); 
Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011); Mark A. 
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting 
Innovation, 56 STANFORD L. REV. 1345 (2004). 
 
                                                     
11 - Reese - Final, with RAR edits.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:30 PM 
2015] CAMPBELL & THE THIRD FAIR USE FACTOR 813 
approach can been seen in the fact that more than half of the appellate 
fair use decisions since Campbell involve use of the entire work, and 
nearly half of those “entire work” decisions find the defendant’s use fair. 
And the approach to the third factor set forth in Campbell appears to 
have played a role in courts finding fair use where the defendant used 
the plaintiff’s entire work in a manner enabled by a new technology. In 
all five of the seven cases in which the court found such use fair, the 
court analyzed the third factor at least in part in terms of whether the use 
was reasonable in light of the purpose. If technological developments 
continue to enable uses that allow or demand the use of entire 
copyrighted works, Campbell’s reasonableness approach likely will 
remain important in resolving claims that such uses are fair. 
 
 
